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Given the considerable increase in international trade over the past 40 years, particularly 
between Africa and the rest of the world, there is a risk that the developing African countries are 
being exploited by the developed countries. The key to this exploitation is the fact that Africa 
possesses untouched natural resources (embedded with significant profits), which the developed 
countries, specifically profit seeking companies from these countries (“the non-resident entity”), 
seek to extract and exploit.  
Vital to the protection of the African countries’ rights to benefit from the use of their natural 
resources is that an appropriate price is afforded to the African c untries in this regard. The 
mechanism provided in this regard is the appropriate allocation of taxing rights to the African 
countries, which is generally governed by the conclusion of double tax agreements between the 
African countries and the other Contracting State, specifically the definition of a permanent 
establishment concluded in the double tax agreement. 
Based on a review of the double tax agreements entered into by a selection of the ‘oil rich’ 
African countries, this dissertation considers whether these selected ‘oil rich’ African countries 
are actually in a position to reap the appropriate benefit, through the concluded definition of a 
permanent establishment, should a person/entity from another country seek to benefit from the 
extraction of its oil reserves. 
This dissertation undertook the review of the relevant articles of the double tax agreements 
entered into by a selection of the ‘oil rich’ African countries to identify whether the definition of 
a permanent establishment, as defined in the respective double tax agreements, provides an 
appropriate right for the selected ‘oil rich’ African states to tax the extraction or use of their 
natural resources by the non-resident entity. The findings of this dissertation are based on a 
review of the double tax agreements from an international tax perspective.  A review of the 
domestic tax laws of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries was beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
The review indicates that in terms of the content of the double tax agreements entered into by 















entered into force do provide the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries with the appropriate taxing 
rights. A few deviations were identified which appear to be specific to certain double tax 
agreements, and they raise a few pertinent questions. Given the limitations of this dissertation, 
the answers to the questions raised requires further analysis which would require a review of the 
domestic tax legislations of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, as well as the political and 
economic environment between the Contracting States. 
Despite these relatively positive findings, looking beyond the review of the double tax 
agreements of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have concluded, it is noted that that these 
countries have not entered into double tax agreements with the appropriate Contracting States, 
i.e. the countries who are the largest oil exporters from the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries 
and the home countries of the largest oil companies.  
Based on these findings the following recommendations are proposed: 
1 All the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries should negotiate double tax agreements with the 
identified key Contracting States with respect to oil extraction activities.  
2 It is recommended that the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries follow one of either the 
OECD or UN model tax conventions when negotiating these double tax agreements. 
3 Where the identified deviations create uncertainty as to whether the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries’ taxing rights are appropriately allocated with regard to oil extraction 
activities, clarification should be sought either through re-negotiation or issuing an 
appropriate protocol. 
4 That a sub-committee(s) to either or both the OECD or UN fiscal committees is created with 
















Abbreviations and Glossary 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CAEU Council of Arab Economic Unity 
DTA Double Tax Agreement 
EEZ Exclusive economic zone 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
The 1958 Convention Geneva Convention of 1958 
IBFD International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
IFA International Fiscal Association 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD Commentary Commentary on the OECD MTC 
OECD MTC OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
PE Permanent establishment 
UMA The Arab Maghreb Union 
UN United Nations 
UN Commentary Commentary on the UN MTC 
UN MTC UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
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1 Introduction and overview 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Africa, its natural resources and its integration with international trade 
International trade has increased considerably over the past 40 years, particularly between 
Africa and the rest of the world.1
This dissertation considers a taxpayer from one tax jurisdiction (the “non-resident”) entering an 
African country, rich in natural resources, to earn profits.  The issue arising is whether or not the 
so-called ‘source State’ [the African country], in which the profits are earned, has (or should 
have) the right to tax such profits.  This consideration of international tax requires an 
understanding of the interaction of the domestic (source state) tax system (African country) with 
the tax system of the country from which the non-resident hails (resident state).  
 This is a result of the increased awareness by developed 
countries, more particularly profit seeking companies from these countries, of the untouched 
natural resources (embedded with significant profits) that the developing countries of Africa 
possess.  
Whether or not the developing, natural resource rich African country reaps the appropriate 
benefits from the use by the non-resident of its natural resources becomes of critical importance 
where the enterprise is resident in a developed country and is operating in a developing country. 
To avoid the situation in which the developed country reaps all the benefits (economic and 
taxation) and leaves the developing African countries with nothing, improved protection of 
these African countries’ rights, particularly with regard to the taxing rights, is vital to their 
development and wealth.   
This is not to say that the developing African countries allow the non-resident taxpayers to 
abuse their resources. The taxing authorities of the two countries will usually attempt to recover 
what they feel to be the appropriate amount of taxes through their domestic tax legislation. 
However, in such situations there are generally issues as to which countries’ taxing authority 
has the right to tax the profits of the taxpayer. The intention of DTAs negotiated between the 
                                                     
1 Increase in exports of merchandise: 1970 to 1990 = 560%; 1990 to 2009 = 260%; 1970 to 2009 = over 2000%. 
World Trade Organisation. (Time series data). Statistics Database. Available: 















two States is to assist in allocating the taxing rights appropriately between the residence and 
source States. Although DTAs do assist in clarifying the taxing rights of the Contracting States, 
as they generally override domestic taxation laws, they can also be detrimental to the African 
countries if they are not negotiated correctly, for example by limiting or denying taxing rights.  
Although a DTA generally allows the country of source to tax business profits, the basic 
concept is that a taxpayer will not be liable to tax on profits it has earned in a country other than 
the taxpayer’s country of residence, unless the taxpayer has a real and substantial economic 
nexus with the country of source, i.e. where the profits accrue.  DTAs have established that such 
substantial nexus only exists if the taxpayer carries on its business in the source country through 
a PE in that country. 
Given the focus of this dissertation on the ‘oil rich’ African countries and the extraction of their 
oil resources, it would appear that there should be no issue as to the allocation of the taxing 
rights and the ‘oil rich’ African country would have the right to benefit from the use of its 
natural resource, oil. However, the economic reality is such that the profit driven intention of the 
non-resident taxpayer is to try and structure its operations in a manner to maximise its benefit, 
i.e. minimise the taxes it would have to pay over to the relevant taxing authorities. Such 
practices are to the detriment of the source state, i.e. leaving the source state with little or no tax 
revenue for its now depleted natural resources.  
There are, however, contradicting forces behind whether the African country would prefer to:  
a)  reap the rewards from the use by the non-resident of its domestic resources, through the 
incidence of taxation; or 
b) obtain the investment (in more general terms) of the non-residents, particularly from the 
developed world, in the African country through tax incentives that can be offered.  
However, given the significant increase in the demand for oil worldwide, and coupled by the 
increased oil production capacity of the African countries,2
                                                     
2 At the end of 2008 the oil produced by the aggregate of the African countries, amounted to 11.5% of the World’s 
production (bbl/day).  CIA. (2010). Country Comparison: Oil - production. Available: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2173rank.html. Last accessed 17 December 
2010. 
 such incentives should not be 















imperative for the African countries to implement strict provisions to ensure that they reap the 
appropriate rewards for the use of this vital and limited natural resource.  
Given this requirement to protect these African countries’ natural resources and, in turn, 
improving Africa’s wealth and development, the relevant DTAs of the African countries read 
with their respective domestic tax legislations, should be seen as a key protection mechanism.  
As the extraction of oil entails substantial resources and time (refer to paragraph 1.1.2), the non-
resident taxpayer would have to set-up some form of operation within the African country. 
Accordingly, the non-resident taxpayer could be seen to be operating its business as if it were a 
resident taxpayer, i.e. creating a real and substantial economic nexus in the African country. 
This nexus is only considered to exist if the taxpayer is carrying on its business in the source 
country through a PE in the African country.  The definition and interpretation of a PE must, 
therefore, be analysed. 
The term “permanent establishment” is defined in terms of Article 5 of the OECD MTC. 
Broadly speaking, a PE refers to “a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”.3
The UN MTC is to a large extent consistent with the OECD MTC, but it is broader in its scope 
with regard to specific inclusions and also narrower in its exclusions.
 It specifically includes a place of management, a 
branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place 
of extraction of natural resources. Specifically excluded from the definition is, inter alia, the 
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, 
any activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character.  
4
Despite the definition provided in these MTCs, there is no hard and fast interpretation of the 
article defining the term. Thus, there is scope for a taxpayer to apply a beneficial interpretation, 
possibly leading to the scenario in which the African country is left with nothing to show for its 
subsequently depleted natural resources. The interpretation of the term PE differs throughout the 
tax world, despite the efforts taken to try and create one interpretation (refer to chapter 
   
3). The 
                                                     
3 Article 5(1), OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. 
p24 -25.  
4 United Nations - Department of Economic & Social Affairs (2001). UN Model Double Taxation Convention 















issues of the integration of the domestic tax legislations of the treaty countries and the DTAs 
concluded to provide relief where the latter does not deem the country to have the primary 
taxing rights, also exists.  
1.1.2 Oil extraction activities 
The oil and gas industry includes the global processes of exploration, extraction, refining, 
transporting, and marketing oil and gas products. There are two major sectors within the oil and 
gas industry, upstream and downstream.5
Oil extraction activities involve oil drilling and services. Oil drilling and services are broken 
into two major areas: drilling and oilfield services. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation the focus is on 
upstream, which is the process of extracting the oil and refining it, thus, more specifically the 
process of extracting the oil. Whereas downstream is the commercial side of the business, such 
as gas stations or the delivery of oil for heat. For the purposes of this dissertation an in-depth 
analysis of the oil extraction process is not necessary, however a high-level understanding of 
what the process involves is required.  
• Drilling - Drilling companies physically drill and pump oil out of the ground. In the drilling 
industry, there are several different types of rigs, each with a specialized purpose. Some of 
these include:  
− Land Rigs - Drilling depths ranges from 5,000 to 30,000 feet.  
− Submersible Rigs - Used for ocean, lake and swamp drilling. The bottom part of these 
rigs are submerged to the sea's floor and the platform is on top of the water.  
− Jack-ups - this type of rig has three legs and a triangular platform which is jacked-up 
above the highest anticipated waves.  
− Drill Ships - These look like tankers/ships, but they travel the oceans in search of oil in 
extremely deep water.  
• Oilfield Services - Oilfield service companies assist the drilling companies in setting up oil 
and gas wells. In general these companies manufacture, repair and maintain equipment used 
in oil extraction and transport. More specifically, these services can include:  
                                                     
5 Some see the industry as being divided into three major components: upstream, midstream and downstream, but the 















− Seismic Testing - This involves mapping the geological structure beneath the surface. 
− Transport Services - Both land and water rigs need to be moved around from time to-
time.  
As the focus is on the drilling activities, which given the substantial skill, expertise and 
machinery involved, requires the use of substantial resources over a significant period of time. 
1.1.3 African unions 
To assist in the development of the African community, certain groups of African countries, 
generally identified by geographical region, have formed unions to assist in developing and 
facilitating its incorporation into the international market. One form of assistance is the creation 
of tax agreements that facilitate trade between the African member states. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, the tax agreements from two of these African unions are applicable. 
1.1.3.1 Council of Arab Economic Unity 
The Arab Economic Union Council, more commonly referred to as the CAEU, was established 
by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen on 3 June 1957. It became effective 30 May 1964, with the 
ultimate goal of achieving complete economic unity among its member states.6
For the purpose of this dissertation, the member countries to the CAEU have formed a regional 
DTA under which the taxing rights are allocated between the member states, and accordingly, 
this DTA will be reviewed in light of the purpose of this dissertation. 
 
1.1.3.2 Arab Maghreb Union 
The UMA was created under the Marrakech Treaty on 17 February 1989 by Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The UMA aims to encourage joint ventures and to create a 
regional single market. The strategic relevance of the region is based on the fact that, 
collectively, it boasts large phosphate, oil, and gas and it is a transit centre to southern Europe. 
The success of the Union would, therefore be economically important.  
                                                     















The tax treaty was signed by the five countries of the UMA on 23 July 1995, and replaced the 
treaties between Algeria and each of the other member states, which were suspended. However, 
despite the intention behind the AMU, the evolution of the integration process within the UMA 
member states is in practice blocked by the international embargo imposed on Libya, the 
domestic crisis in Algeria and certain dissension between the member countries.7
In addition it is noted that Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia are members of both the AMU and 
CAEU’s tax treaties. Accordingly, for the purpose of this dissertation, as Libya is one of the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, these tax treaties will also be compared to assess whether 
there is any possible interpretational conflict that could result with respect to the taxation of 
PE’s created by oil extraction activities. 
 Despite this, 
for the purpose of this dissertation, what is to be assessed is whether the UMA DTA provides 
the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries which are member states to the UMA which the 
appropriate taxing rights with regard to oil extraction activities.  
1.2 Research problem  
Given the problems identified, this dissertation serves to identify whether the definition of PE, 
as stated in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ DTAs currently entered into force with 
other countries, provides an appropriate right for the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to tax 
the profits associated with the extraction of their natural resources, specifically oil, by the non-
resident. 
1.3 Scope of this dissertation 
Not all the African countries have oil reserves and, accordingly, this dissertation covers only the 
‘oil rich’ countries of North and Central Africa (as determined by oil production). Based on the 
2008 world’s oil production statistics collated by the CIA, Africa produces approximately 
11.5% of the World’s oil (barrels per day), of which approximately 10.5% is produced in 
Central and North Africa in the following countries:8
                                                     
7 IBFD. (2010). Glossary. Available: http://k-online2.ibfd.org/kbase/. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
  
8 CIA. (2010). Country Comparison: Oil - production. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-































It would appear that no research has been undertaken on the taxing rights for these oil rich 
African countries, thus, it would be key to the development of these countries that these rights 
are identified and, if required, corrected to ensure that they are not exploited for the benefit of 
the already developed countries in which these foreign multi-national taxpayers generally 
originate.  
 
Thus, this dissertation serves to provide a review of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries (entered into force on or before 1 June 2010), primarily focussing on the 
PE definition Articles, with the objective to test these definitions against the definitions 
provided by the OECD and UN MTCs, generally seen as the guiding principles. In addition, this 
dissertation seeks to ascertain whether the taxing rights contained within the DTAs entered into 
provide for the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to reap the rewards for the oil resources 
through primary taxing rights.  
                                                                                                                                                           
‘oil rich’ African countries also have the six largest ‘proved oil reserves’, see CIA. (2010). Country Comparison: Oil 
– proved reserves. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html. 
Last accessed 20 December 2010.  
9 According to The Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Algeria held an estimated 12.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as 
of January 2010, the third largest in Africa (behind Libya and Nigeria). EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - 
Algeria. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algeria/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
10 According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), as of January 2010 Angola has proven oil reserves of 9.5 billion 
barrels while statements made by the Angolan oil minister in December 2009 put total reserve numbers as high as 
13.1 billion barrels. EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Angola. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Angola/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
11 According to the Oil and Gas Journal’s January 2010 estimate, Egypt’s proven oil reserves stand at 3.7 billion 
barrels. EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Egypt. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Oil.html. 
Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
12 Libya, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), holds the largest proven oil 
reserves in Africa, followed by Nigeria and Algeria. According to Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Libya had total proven 
oil reserves of 44 billion barrels as of January 2010, the largest reserves in Africa. EIA. (2010). Country Analysis 
Briefs - Libya. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Libya/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
13 According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Nigeria had an estimated 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of 
January 2010. EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Nigeria. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
14 According to Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), Sudan had five billion barrels of proved oil reserves in January 2010 up 
from an estimated 563 million barrels in 2006. EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Sudan. Available: 















Such a comparative review should prove useful for renegotiation and future negotiation of 
DTAs, so as to bring about more effective taxation on business profits derived by non-resident 
taxpayers from a source within the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
1.4 Limitations of this dissertation 
Domestic tax laws of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries 
The analysis is limited to the international interpretation of the definition of a PE.  For this 
reason, analysis of the domestic tax laws of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries is excluded 
from the scope of this dissertation.  Where further analysis (outside the scope of this 
dissertation) would require analysis of such domestic tax laws, it is indicated. 
DTAs with the United States 
As the treaties entered into with the United States are developed based on a model dissimilar in 
many respects from the UN and OECD MTC’s, the treaties entered into with the US are noted, 
however, the review of the US treaties have been excluded from this dissertation.  In addition, 
the States examined based their DTAs mainly on the UN and OECD Models.   
Official translations of the DTAs 
It is noted that official translation of some of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries are currently only available in non-English text. As such, unofficial English 
translations of these DTAs have been used for the purposes of the comparative review.15
In addition, at the time of writing this dissertation, no English translation, official or unofficial, 
was available for a few of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
Accordingly, these DTAs were excluded for the purpose of this dissertation.
 
16
                                                     

















1.5 Research methodology 
The dissertation will entail a review of African and international (beyond Africa) literature, 
DTAs, and explanatory memoranda regarding the taxing rights relating to the PE definition and 
the interpretation and the practical implications thereof.  
The interpretation methodology to be implemented will be based on customary international law 
devising international interpretational rules (refer to chapter 2). This will be extrapolated to the 
interpretation of the relevant DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, 
using the commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs as a complementary addition to the 
interpretation base, so as to align with the VCLT, which is essentially the codification of 
customary international law (refer to paragraph 2.2).17
1.6  Structure 
   
Each chapter in this dissertation answers questions relevant to the central theme as to whether 
the definition of PE, as stated in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ DTAs, provides an 
appropriate right for the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to tax the profits associated with 
the extraction of their oil resources by the non-resident taxpayer. 
Chapter 2 serves to devise the international interpretational rules, i.e. customary international 
law, to be implemented when reviewing the DTAs for the purpose of this dissertation.  
Implementing these interpretational rules, chapter 3 provides an analysis of the international 
interpretation of a PE, and then analyses the PE definitions provided in the DTAs of the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries. 
Although the PE definitions provided in the reviewed DTAs may indicate that the non-resident 
taxpayer carrying on its business, i.e. oil extraction activities, in the selected oil rich’ African 
countries, has a PE, chapters 4 and 5 analyse whether the DTAs appropriately allocate the 
taxing rights to the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. Chapter 4 analyses the equivalent of 
Article 7 of the OECD and UN MTCs of the DTAs, which provides that the country, in which 
the PE is located, has the primary taxing right to profits earned from the business carried on 
                                                     
















through the PE. Chapter 5 then analyses whether the scoping provisions of the reviewed DTAs 
contain any deviations that would specifically exclude or include the taxation of profits from oil 
extraction activities, undertaken by a non-resident taxpayer in the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries, from the provisions of the reviewed DTAs. 
As oil extraction activities are performed both on land and offshore, chapter 6 analyses whether 
the reviewed DTAs provide for such ‘mobile’ activities, and the extent of the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries’ taxing rights. 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis as to whether the use of a pipeline to transport the extracted oil 
would create a PE and thus provide the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries with taxing rights to 
the profits from such transportation. 
Chapter 8 assesses whether the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have concluded DTAs with 
the key countries exploiting the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ oil reserves. 

















2 International interpretation of DTAs 
2.1 Introduction 
Before a comparative analysis of the relevant DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries can be performed, a uniform interpretation base (from an international 
perspective) is required. 
DTAs are treaties under international law, aiming to avoid double taxation by way of defining 
types of income, profit or capital and, through procedural rules, distributing them among 
Contracting States. Furthermore, it is their goal to create legal certainty for the benefit of 
Contracting States as well as for taxpayers and to assure the equal application of tax laws in the 
Contracting States.18
Skaar (1991:39) states that when discussing treaty-related aspects of international taxation, a 
position is to be taken as to whether there is a methodology of international law, specifically tax 
law. Skaar’s view is that such a methodology exists and is based on customs and treaties and is 
supported by various international courts as well as other authors
  
19
In practice, however, the domestic interpretation of DTAs may differ between Contracting 
States. In some Contracting States priority is generally given to the ordinary meaning of the 
treaty terms (known as the ‘literal’ approach).  In contrast, some Contracting States interpret 
these terms based on the intent and purpose of the DTA (known as the ‘purposive’ approach).  
 on the topic.  
The differences arise as a result of the fact that the DTAs embody a large number of indefinite 
terms, rendering them open to interpretation, whereas domestic tax laws are usually very 
specific, with limited scope for interpretation. As bilateral treaties divide commonly understood 
                                                     
18 Vogel, K and Prokisch, R. (1993). Interpretation of double taxation conventions; General report. IFA Cahiers. 78 
(A), p55. 
19 Jones, A et al., The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with particular reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model, 
Part I, British Tax Review 14n. l (1984); Vogel, K., Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 International 
Tax & Business Lawyer 4, 31 (1986); Jones/Oliver, How Others See Us, British Tax Review 437-440 (1988); see 















taxing rights between Contracting States, with potentially different systems of taxation,20
DTAs are phrased in a manner not necessarily consistent with (and generally broader than) the 
domestic legislation. The broad language used in the DTA is necessary to ensure the life of the 
DTA beyond the date of signature and to incorporate a common understanding of the term.
 the 
common meaning is crucial in identifying the meaning of the articles of a DTA. 
21
This approach expands the usual domestic application of the literal approach and the necessity 
to take a broader meaning into consideration. Such a form of interpretation may be found in the 
creation of ‘transnational’ legal terms, of which there is currently none, but, the MTCs created 
by the League of Nations, the OECD and the UN must be considered as steps in the 
development towards such an international language of specified terms.
  
  From an African 
perspective, this is supported by South African case law which referred to the use of an 
‘international fiscal language’.22
2.2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
  
23
DTAs, as international agreements, are governed by the VCLT.
  
24 Although, there are only 35 
states which are signatories to the VCLT, it is widely accepted that Articles 31-33 of the VCLT 
codifies already valid customary law25
                                                     
20 Vogel (1997) states: “[f]or the effective interpretation of international treaties […] it is necessary to reconcile the 
various national methods of interpretation”. 
 and hence, all international treaties would (as they are 
21 West, C (2009). The Taxation of International (non-resident) Sportspersons in South Africa. PhD Thesis. 
University of Cape Town. p26.  
22 SIR v Downing 1975 37 SATC 249, supported by Vogel (1997: 37) as do Olivier and Honiball (2008: 40) referring 
to Amatucci, A. (2006). The Scientific Autonomy of Tax Law: A Methodical Approach. In: Amatucci, A. International 
Tax Law. Netherlands: Kluwer. p157. 
23 United Nations (2005). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - 1969. Vienna: United Nations. p1-31. 
24 23 May 1969, which came into effect when the 35th state joined on 27 January 1980 
25 The International Court of Justice and a number of foreign courts have essentially recognised that the VCLT 
represents a codification of customary international law. For an extensive analysis see Engelen (2004) (who does 
concede that “a distinction can be made between already existing rules of customary international law, rules of 
customary international law that became crystallised in the adoption of the Convention [VCLT], and rules set forth in 
the Convention that eventually may become a rule of customary international law”. Vogel (1997) and Ward et al 
(2005) support the general codification view with respect to the VCLT.  See also Arnold BJ, ‘The Interpretation of 
Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality’, Bulletin for International Taxation (January 2010), who states that the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention, which apply to all treaties, are binding on all nations because they constitute a codification of 
the rules of customary international law. It should be noted that Arnold does conclude that the provisions of the 















governed by customary law) be governed by the rules of interpretation of the VCLT in an 
unrestricted manner.26
Engelen, quoting Sir Ian Sinclair, provides that “there is now strong judicial support for the 
view that the rules of treaty interpretation incorporated in the Convention [referring to the 
VCLT] are declaratory of customary law” and further that “the Hoge Raad also seemed to have 
accepted that the rules of treaty interpretation laid down in Articles 31 to 33 [of the] VCLT are 
a codification of existing customary international law”.
 
27 Thus, it is submitted that Articles 31-
33 of the VCLT do represent customary international law.28
Looking to the general intention of the VCLT, it provides that Contracting States entering into 
international agreements, such as a DTA, should take into account certain factors when entering 




2.2.1 VCLT interpretation guidelines 
 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT contain general rules of interpretation for international treaties. 
Article 31(1) states a basic rule of general validity, indicating that any interpretation of a DTA 
has to start with the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the treaty, i.e. an objective 
interpretation.30 Article 31(2) defines the term ‘context’, indicating that the context in which the 
term is used must be analysed, as must the intention of the legislator or the respective parties to 
the DTA and the purpose of the provision.31
Looking to the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the substantial 
activities involved in oil extraction allow for a fairly simple context in which to analyse such 
  
                                                     
26 Vogel and Prokisch. (1993). Interpretation of double taxation conventions; General report. IFA Cahiers. 78 (A), 
p55. 
27 Engelen, F (2004). Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law. Netherlands: IBFD Publications. p54-
55. 
28 Also supported by West (2009:26) 
29 Refer to Annexure B1 for a listing of the factors. 
30 Vogel et al (1997:73) states that the “commentary on the final draft [of the VCLT] by the International Law 
Commission states that: ‘The article (Drafted initially in the VCLT as Article 27 but now is Article 31) […] is based 
on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intention of the parties; and that, in 
consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab 
initio into the intentions of the parties’”. Vogel repeats this assertion in his work, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions. 2nd ed. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. p37.  
31 This manner of interpretation was clearly followed in SIR v Downing, [1975] 37 SATC 249, in which the South 















interpretation. The intention of the Contracting States and the forces32
In addition Article 32 of the VCLT provides for supplementary means of interpretation, 
indicating that the commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs should also play a role in the 
interpretation of the relevant DTAs.
 driving their mutual 
agreement in concluding the DTA, provide the purpose of the DTA. As most of the DTAs 
entered into by the international community are primarily based on the OECD and UN MTCs, 
the first port of call for interpretation would be the internationally accepted interpretation 
policies (embodied in the VCLT, and discussed here) with regard to these MTCs. 
33  Whether the OECD Commentaries should be considered 
as customary international law and within the scope of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT has been 
debated at length internationally and is by no means settled.34
It is submitted that while the commentaries and other sources do not form part of the context of 
the DTAs, such sources may have bearing in determining a common intention between the 
states, noted above as a key determination of the “ordinary meaning” of the term in terms of the 
VCLT. However, such reliance is contingent on whether such source would be recognised in 
international courts. In the South African case (SIR v Downing), for example, reference was 
made to the lower courts usage of the OECD Commentary, however, the judge did not place any 
reliance on the commentary in the determination of the judgment.  
 
Generally, the OECD and UN Commentaries are not considered as binding in international 
law.35 While the OECD Commentaries have not been declared customary international law, 
should they fall within the ambit of Articles 31 or 32 of the VCLT, they would be considered an 
interpretational tool in terms of customary international law.36
                                                     
32 Being political or fiscal drivers, such as incentivising foreign investment.   
 As regards the OECD 
33 Pijl, H notes in his article, published in the November 2002 IBFD Bulletin ‘The Concept of Permanent 
Establishment and the Proposed Changes to the OECD Commentary with Special Reference to Dutch Case Law’, 
that under Dutch case law, the Commentary is authoritative for the interpretation of existing tax treaties.  
34 Ward et al (2005) illustrates this point where the authors state: “As is the case with the Commentaries themselves, 
we have not arrived at unanimity in our views. What we express as our views […] should be understood by the reader 
to be a wide, but not always full agreement of the authors”. The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular 
Reference of the Commentaries on the OECD Model. Amsterdam: IBFD Publications. p5.  
35 The OECD Commentaries themselves indicate as much. 
36 Van Brunschot, F (2005) (Judge of Netherlands Supreme Court) states: “The maximum value of the Commentaries 
is that of an expert opinion of great weight. They have an uncontested significance for the interpretation of treaties to 
the extent that they existed at the time a particular treaty was concluded; the significance of the later versions of the 
Commentaries is less clear”. Van Brunschot (2005) also noted that in a number of Dutch cases, the Supreme Court 
stated that the OECD Model and its Commentaries in particular are “of great importance” for treaty interpretation 
(and not only as the lower court had put it, “may give some support”, BNB 1992/379). Further support is provided by 















Commentaries that existed at the time the DTA was concluded, most authors appear to be in 
agreement that the OECD Commentaries fall within Article 31 of the VCLT.37
Considering the above, it is submitted that the OECD and UN Commentaries have a definite 
place in determining the common intention of the negotiating states. However, it should be 
borne in mind that they are a supplementary means of interpretation, and they are not 
independent criteria of interpretation but are subordinate in terms of importance. They may 
confirm a result but not correct it, or they may help to explain a doubtful term under very 
specific circumstances.  
  
The application of the VCLT by itself does not lead to a uniform interpretation by Contracting 
States. The rules of interpretation in the VCLT are formulated in a general way and, themselves,  
leave considerable room for interpretation. Nevertheless, the VCLT identifies the most 
important elements of interpretation and puts them in a relationship to each other, thus aiding 
the interpreter in assigning relative weights to the different elements.38
2.2.2 Multilingual DTAs 
 
The VCLT provides for multilingual treaties, where both copies are generally signed and the 
languages given equal authority. However, it is noted that for some of the DTAs entered into by 
the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the official translation of the DTAs entered into are 
currently only available in non-English text. For the purpose of this dissertation the unofficial 
English translations were used, accordingly, should possible further interpretation 
differences/issues arise due to multilingual treaties, the provisions of Article 33 to the VCLT 
should be considered.39
                                                                                                                                                           
treaty incorporates the wording of the [OECD] Model, although not legally binding, can be presumed to reflect 
generally the intentions of the treaty negotiators”. In the supporting footnote they add: “This is reinforced when, 
which is sometimes the case, the government when presenting a bill to parliament to implement a tax treaty in 
domestic law, refers to the fact that the treaty was based on the OECD Model”. 
  
 
38 Sinclair, J (1984). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2nd ed.: Manchester University Press. p 153. 
39 In some treaties the dispute resolution mechanism is identified in the treaty, and provides that disputes are to be 
settled using one of the versions of the DTA. However, where equal weight is given to both languages and the dispute 
resolution mechanism has not been identified, it is submitted that the courts should attempt to reconcile the two terms 















2.3 Ambulatory vs. static interpretation 
Given Africa’s recent increased role in the ‘oil rich’ community, the older DTAs entered into by 
the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries may be more beneficial to one of the Contracting States 
(generally the non-African country) than had the DTA been negotiated more recently, or vice 
versa, due to the shift in power as regards this natural resource.   
Thus, in addition to the interpretation of the terms of a DTA, one also needs to assess the timing 
of the interpretation of the law. There are two forms of interpretation that can be followed: 
1 Interpretation of the law at the time the DTA was signed, “static interpretation”; or 
2 Interpretation of the law at the time the tax case arises, “ambulatory interpretation”. 
Without going into a detailed analysis of the history and developments of interpretation 
principles in this regard there are arguments and case law for both forms of interpretation.  
Given the fact that the process of negotiating new treaties is both time consuming and 
expensive, ambulatory interpretation is preferred, if not critical, to the life of a DTA to take into 
account subsequent amendments, so as to ensure the purpose of the tax treaties does not 
becoming ineffective over time. To what extent that ambulatory approach should be extended to 
the OECD Commentaries and their use in interpretation of DTAs needs to be considered.40 
However, it should be noted that ambulatory interpretation should be adopted with some 
limitations.41
Just as the OECD Commentaries existing at the time the DTA was signed would have a 
persuasive effect in international courts where a DTA was based on the OECD Model, it is 
 
                                                     
40 West (2009:31). See also Pijl H (2002). The Concept of Permanent Establishment and the Proposed Changes to the 
OECD Commentary with Special Reference to Dutch Case Law. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. 5, p554. In his 
article, Pijl goes further to state that under Dutch case law the interpretation should be in line with the last version of 
the Commentary.  
41 Skaar, A (1991). Permanent Establishment, Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle. India: Wolters Kluwer India Pvt 
Ltd. p 54. See also Avery Jones et al., The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with particular reference to Article 3(2) of 















submitted that certain of the later commentaries should be considered to also have a persuasive 
effect and others should not be taken into consideration by the courts.42
It is submitted that, given the uncertainty as to the status of the OECD Commentaries in 
international circles and the varied use by the foreign courts of the OECD Commentaries in the 
interpretation of DTAs and the possible reluctance of international courts to declare the OECD 
Commentary customary international law, at best the OECD Commentary should be an 
interpretational tool in terms of customary international law. Accordingly, the commentaries 
should have a persuasive effect where clarity is sought for a particular term used i.e. assisting in 
the interpretation of the context.
 
43
Where the DTA Article deviates from the OECD or UN MTCs, the OECD and UN 
Commentaries may no longer be appropriate. However, the court may still refer to the OECD 
and UN Commentaries for clarification of a term if it is of the opinion that the relevant term is 
used in a similar context. Similar considerations will apply where the African negotiators have 
used other model treaties and the relevant commentaries. It is apparent that the majority of the 
DTAs analysed for the purposes of this dissertation are either based on the OECD or UN MTC, 
but then the deviation relates to a provision in the UN or OECD MTC. Thus, although 
individually possibly not able to provide influential guidance, the OECD and UN Commentaries 
read together would provide strong influential interpretative guidance. 
  
2.4 Treaty interpretation under domestic tax laws 
This aspect of the topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation. An analysis of this aspect would 
involve a review of the approach to the interpretation of tax treaties in each of the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries, and even as this sample is limited to a handful of countries, it would be 
a sizeable undertaking. After this review of the individual countries’ practices, it would be 
necessary to analyse these practices to determine the extent to which they are similar to or 
different from one another, and the extent to which they are similar to or different from the 
interpretive approach set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the VLCT.  
                                                     
42 Such as certain contradictory commentary that has the effect of changing the interpretation of the article in a way 
that could not have been contemplated by the negotiators. 
43 van Brunschot, F. The Judiciary and the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentaries. Bulletin for 















Although somewhat dated, the interpretation of tax treaties was one of the main subjects of the 
1993 Florence Congress of the IFA, with the general report by Professors Vogel and Prokisch,44
A tax treaty is negotiated by a particular country with its domestic tax system in mind. As 
discussed, tax treaties limit domestic tax, and they do not impose tax themselves. Tax treaties 
are accessory to domestic tax systems and do not have any independent existence or meaning. 
This relationship between tax treaties and domestic law is illustrated by Article 3(2) of the 
OECD and UN MTCs, which provides that undefined terms in a treaty have the meaning that 
they have under domestic law unless the context of the treaty requires otherwise.  
 
it provides some useful insights into the interpretation of tax treaties under domestic law that are 
still relevant.  
Given that tax treaties and domestic law form an integrated system, it would be surprising if the 
two parts of the system were to be interpreted differently. Nevertheless, the courts in many 
countries purport to apply different interpretive approaches to domestic tax laws and tax treaties, 
and many commentators have concluded that tax treaties should be interpreted more broadly 
than domestic tax laws.45
Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is vital to take note of this interdependence.   
  
2.5 Conclusion 
Given the recent rise of Africa to the international trade community, which has resulted in the 
negotiation and ratification of DTAs between African States and the international community, a 
uniform interpretation base is required. Although there is still a degree of uncertainty as to the 
interpretation of international agreements, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is submitted 
that the VCLT is to be seen as the key driver to the international interpretation base, which, 
coupled with the importance of the OECD and UN MTCs and their commentaries,46
                                                     
44 Vogel, K and Prokisch, R. (1993). Interpretation of double taxation conventions; General report. IFA Cahiers. 78 
(A), p55-85. See also Edwardes-Ker (1995 looseleaf). Tax Treaty Interpretation. Dublin: In-Depth Publishing. 
Chapter 3.  
 could result 
45 “Generally speaking there seems to be a consensus among the National Reporters that double taxation conventions 
should be interpreted more broadly than domestic law”. Vogel, K and Prokisch, R. (1993). Interpretation of double 
taxation conventions; General report. IFA Cahiers. 78 (A), p 60.  
46  It is noted that South Africa has entered an observation into the 2010 OECD MTC that it will apply the 2008 
Commentary when interpreting Article 7, which provides support that South Africa (and other African states) will use 















in a high degree of uniformity of interpretation of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries. In addition, the ambulatory and contextual interpretation of the DTAs 
entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries should be followed in analysing the PE 
definition provided by the DTAs.47
  
  
                                                     
47 It is submitted that Article 2(4) of both the OECD and UN MTCs provides some support for the ambulatory 
approach in that the Article refers to the application of the MTC to ‘any identical or substantially similar taxes that 
are imposed after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. The 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of any significant changes that have been 
made in their taxation laws.’ i.e. the reference to future taxes in the DTA affirms the view that a DTA is agreed upon 















3 International interpretation of a PE 
The importance of a PE is that a State would be entitled to tax profits associated with the 
business conducted through a PE of an enterprise in such State even though the enterprise may 
not be a resident of that State.48
Generally DTAs define a PE, accordingly, the treaty definition is decisive.
 Although a simple concept, in practice it is the interpretation of 
a PE that creates significant economic consequences for taxpayers, tax authorities and in turn 
the governments of the Contracting States. 
49 However, the fact 
that the DTA defines a PE using other terms which are not defined,50 creates difficulties for tax 
advisers and tax authorities when interpreting DTAs.51
For the purpose of this dissertation, a uniform interpretation of the PE definition is required to 
allow for an independent comparative analysis of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries. In order to set this universal interpretation, an analysis of the OECD and 
UN MTCs and their commentaries is required. 
 That there is no standard (universal) 
interpretation and application of the terms making up the definition of a PE, creates the greatest 
difficulty. The numerous articles and reports published on the interpretation of the PE definition 
focus on the extent of the issue and note the judicial and administrative guidance available to 
interpret the definition of a PE in DTAs. This focus accounts for the objective of seeking to 
formulate a universal interpretation of a PE, coupled with the international customary law based 
on the principles provided by the VCLT.  
3.1 OECD and UN MTCs’ definitions 
3.1.1 Purpose of the OECD and UN MTCs 
Given the harmful effects of double taxation, it is necessary to stress the importance of 
removing the obstacles that such double taxation presents to the development of worldwide 
                                                     
48 Olivier, L and Honiball, M (2008). International Tax - A South African Overview. 4th ed. South Africa: Siber Ink. 
p95. 
49 Article 3 of the OECD and UN MTCs 
50 Skaar, A (1991). Permanent Establishment, Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle. India: Wolters Kluwer India Pvt 
Ltd. p 40. 
















economic relations between countries,52
Based on this simple purpose, the OECD and UN has recognised that it is desirable to clarify, 
standardise, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are engaged in commercial, 
industrial, financial, or any other activities in other countries through the application by all 
countries of common solutions to identical cases of double taxation.
 particularly in promoting the development of the 
African economies.  
53 In turn, the purpose of the 
OECD and UN MTCs is to provide a means of settling on a uniform basis, which is the most 
common problem that arises in the field of international juridical double taxation.54
For the OECD member countries,
   
55 when concluding or revising bilateral conventions, they 
should conform to the OECD MTC as interpreted by the Commentaries thereon. When the text 
of the OECD MTC is reproduced in a bilateral treaty, their tax authorities should also follow 
these Commentaries when applying and interpreting the provisions of their bilateral tax 
conventions that are based on the OECD MTC.56
Given extensive use of the OECD MTCs as a reference for DTA negotiations, it was then used 
as the basis for the original drafting and the subsequent revision of the UN MTC between 
Developed and Developing Countries. The UN MTC thus reproduces a significant part of the 
provisions and Commentaries of the OECD MTC. In addition to the promotion of investment 
flows between developed and developing countries, the UN MTC also proposes that the tax 
 The originating intention of the OECD was to 
assist developed countries in their international dealings with each other, but given the 
expansion of all economies into the international economy, the non-Member countries had to be 
recognised. Accordingly, the impact of the OECD MTC has extended far beyond the OECD 
member countries, and it has been used as a reference in negotiations between Member and non-
Member countries and even between exclusively non-Member countries.  
                                                     
52 Ibid 
53 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. P7. 
54 International juridical double taxation can be defined as the imposition of income taxes in two (or more) states on 
the same taxpayer in respect of the same income, where economic double taxation means the inclusion, by more than 
one state’s tax administration, of the same income in the tax base when the income is in the hands of different 
taxpayers. OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration. Transfer Pricing. Available: 
http://www.eia.oecd.org/document/15/0,3746,en_2649_33753_36156239_1_1_1_1,00.html. Last accessed 
30/01/2011. 
55 Refer to Annexure C for a listing of the OECD member countries 















treaties should contribute to the furtherance of the development aims of the developing 
countries.57
This growing influence of the OECD MTC in non-member countries lead to the agreement, in 




Accordingly, both the Commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs may be very useful in the 
implementation of a DTA concluded by the Contracting States and in the settlement of any 
dispute relating thereto.  
 It is this worldwide recognition of the provisions of the OECD MTC and its 
incorporation into a majority of DTAs that has helped make the Commentaries on the provisions 
of the OECD MTC a widely-accepted guide to the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of existing DTAs, in turn, facilitating the interpretation and enforcement of these 
DTAs along common lines. With regard to the application of the UN MTC, it is understood that 
if the Contracting States decide to use wording suggested in the UN MTC in a DTA, it is to be 
presumed that they would also expect to derive assistance in the interpretation of that wording 
from the Commentary to the UN MTC.  
As submitted earlier, it appears to be the majority view that, in terms of international customary 
law and the VLCT, the Commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs are vital as supplementary 
interpretation guidance.  
In addition it is also reiterated that where the specific DTA Article, as negotiated between the 
Contracting States, deviates from the OECD or UN MTCs, the OECD and UN Commentaries 
may no longer be appropriate. However, it is submitted that reference may still be made to the 
Commentaries for clarification of a term, especially as the majority of the DTAs analysed for 
the purposes of this dissertation are based on either the OECD or UN MTC, and the deviation 
generally relates to a provision in the other MTC (UN or OECD). Thus, the Commentaries to 
the OECD and UN MTCs read together should provide influential interpretative guidance. 
                                                     
57 United Nations - Department of Economic & Social Affairs (2001). UN Model Double Taxation Convention 
between Developed and Developing Countries. New York: United Nations. p vii. 















3.1.2 PE definition – the “basic rule” 
Paragraph 1 to Article 5 of the OECD and UN MTCs provides the general definition of a PE as 
“a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on”.59
Applying this ‘basic rule’ and the three essential characteristics of a PE
  
60
1 There is the existence of a “place of business”, i.e. a facility such as premises or, in certain 
instances, machinery or equipment, as oil extraction activities require premises to operate 
the substantial machinery and equipment involved in oil extraction activities. 
 to oil extraction 
activities to be performed by the non-resident taxpayer, it is submitted that: 
2 The place of business will generally be “fixed”, i.e. it must be established at a distinct place 
with a certain degree of permanence. Oil extraction activities will have a definite degree of 
permanence, albeit not in one distinct place, but rather a geographically distinct area of 
operation. 
3 The carrying on of the oil extraction business can only operate “through” this fixed place. 
As noted, the activities operate through the substantial machinery that will be located at this 
fixed place in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries.  
The above submissions have been arrived at applying the following commonly accepted 
interpretation tests to be applied for both the OECD and UN MTCs’ definition of a PE: 
3.1.2.1 “Place of business” test 
The general understanding in this regard is that the place of business must be fixed in the sense 
that “it is a distinct place, which exhibits some degree of permanence”.61
                                                     
59 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing and United 
Nations - Department of Economic & Social Affairs (2001). UN Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries. New York: United Nations. 
 This general 
60 The Commentary on Article 5 concerning the definition of ‘Permanent Establishment’, July 2010, states that this 
general definition brings out these three essential characteristics. The Commentary to the UN MTC acknowledges 
and agrees with the Commentary to the OECD MTC. 
61 Holmes, K. (2007). Permanent establishments. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties - An Introduction 















understanding is supported by a report prepared for the IFA62 (“the report”) which noted that the 
accepted understanding of the phrase “place of business” is that “it is the physical presence of 
the non-resident taxpayer in the source country”.63
The analysis requires a further breakdown of the phrase. A ‘place’ qualifying for a “place of 
business” is generally interpreted broadly, and any ‘place’ in the ordinary sense of the word may 
be a “place of business”.
 To clarify the physical presence required, 
the report provides that the place of business is generally seen to be a tangible asset of a 
substantial nature, thus, securities and bank accounts, a website, a mailing address all in 
themselves do not meet the place of business test.  
64 Specifically noted in the report is that the place where a drilling ship 
or a rig is located may also be a “place of business”, as well as substantial machinery and 
equipment,65
It is should be noted that it is not as easily applied as one would think, as in some countries it is 
controversial whether the place where the activity is conducted can be a place of business if it is 
also the object of the business activity of the taxpayer.
 and thus may qualify for a PE if other conditions for a PE are met. In addition, the 
report notes that there is no reason to preclude a place of business being situated underground, 
such as mines, quarries and underground pipelines, as these objects are clearly situated ‘in’ a 
country.  
66 Conceptually, these countries 
distinguish between the object of the business and the “place of business”.67 This describes what 
could also be seen as a functionality requirement, in that the purpose of the “place” is “to serve 
the business activity, not to be the subject to the business activity”.68
In addition, it is not sufficient for these countries’ taxing authorities that the enterprise has the 
objective of business activities, yet the ‘place’ must be at the taxpayer’s disposal in a certain 
qualified way. This by no means requires a formal legal right, but merely a right of disposal. 
The counter to this requirement is that mere presence also does not necessarily mean that the 
location is at the disposal of the enterprise.  
  
                                                     























Applying this definition to the oil extraction activities of the non-resident taxpayer, as it 
involves substantial machinery and takes lengthy time periods to extract,69
3.1.2.2 “Location test”  
 it would be difficult 
to argue that the operations set up in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries do not constitute a 
“place of business”. The machinery used is tangible and has a physical presence and is at the 
non-resident taxpayer’s disposal.  In addition, the machinery is generally manned by employees 
or contractors of the non-resident taxpayer. The machinery is not the non-resident taxpayer’s 
objective, the extraction of the oil is the objective, thus, it is submitted that the machinery used 
fulfils the requirement of the place of business test.   
Geographical nexus to the source state  
Sasseville and Skaar’s report (2009) provides that the place of business should be located at a 
specific geographical nexus to constitute a “fixed place of business” for PE purposes. However, 
as already noted, it does not have to be visible from the surface of the earth (underground 
pipelines, railroads, mines, etc.) to meet the requirements under the location test for a PE. In 
addition, it is noted that the place of business does not have to be construction of any kind, thus 
there is no requirement of a mechanical connection to the earth, and thus, a tent or a shanty 
could be sufficiently connected for the location test’s purposes.70
It is submitted that the machinery required to extract oil would create a sufficient geographical 
nexus to the area, at least for a sufficiently significant period of time, to meet this requirement 
of the location test. Accordingly, there should not be any noteworthy disagreement that oil 
extraction activities should constitute a “fixed place of business”. 
  
Business activities that constitute a geographical and commercial coherent whole 
Oil extraction activities are operated both on and offshore. Accordingly, there is an 
understanding that offshore oil extraction, would not always take place at one fixed place, at 
least not for an indefinite period. Thus, even if the non-resident taxpayer is moving around 
                                                     
69 This is in line with the broad interpretation of a “place of business” discussed in Sasseville, J and Skaar, A. (2009). 
Is there a permanent establishment?; General report. IFA Cahiers. 94 (A), p23-43. 
















within a geographically coherent area, as long as that taxpayer is performing a commercially 
coherent business activity, that area may well still constitute one ‘place’ under the location test. 
However, it should be noted that, in terms of the commentary to the OECD MTC, places that 
are only connected commercially, but not connected geographically, do not constitute one 
‘place’. Accordingly, one should always consider that activities which are carried on as part of a 
single project constituting a coherent commercial whole may lack the necessary geographical 
coherence in one geographical location to be considered as one single ‘place’ (of business). 
With regard to oil extraction, although the equipment and machinery are not always 
permanently fixed to the earth, it is submitted that as long as the equipment and machinery have 
some form of temporary nexus to the ground in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the oil 
extraction area should meet the location test for a PE.  
So as not to dispel any chance of the contrary argument, oil extraction does generally form part 
of a larger group of activities that are carried on as part of a single project, i.e. the refinement 
and sale oil, constituting the coherent commercial whole. Thus, it may lack the necessary 
geographical coherence to be considered as one single place. Despite this, it is submitted that 
the strong counter argument would be that oil extraction is part of a bigger project to sell refined 
goods, and that the extraction in itself is a substantial activity with the commercial intention of 
extracting the raw material for sale in its raw form, albeit to the probable head office.  
3.1.2.3 “Duration test” 
The relationship between the duration test and the right of use test 
A business activity is not a PE unless it is performed through a place of business, which is vital 
to the answer to the question posed by Sasseville and Skaar’s report (2009):  
“Should the duration test be related to the place of business, to the business activity or to 
anything else?” 71
The answer is based on nothing more than logic in that if a legal right of use to the place of 
business is required for a PE to be constituted, it has to relate it to the duration test. The follow 
  
















up question posed, most relevant to oil extraction activities, is “What constitutes ‘permanent’ in 
the interpretation of the duration test?” 72
Various reports and commentators confirm that there is no universal view that ‘permanent’ 
requires perpetuity, but what is vital is a form of permanence, which in itself should be open to 
differing views of interpretation, and ultimately is a question of degree.  
  
The period fixed in the construction clause to the PE definition of the OECD MTC does not 
assist taxpayers involved in non-construction activities. However, it could provide for a base 
guideline as to what the Contracting States have agreed to as a marker for permanency.73 As 
with any form of interpretation, subject to the circumstances in each case, it would appear that 
practice has shown that the duration test is met where the right of use to the place of business 
was maintained for a period of at least six months.74 However, the application of the duration 
test has often been denied for shorter periods,75
The vital element as to the degree of permanency lies in the activity undertaken and the 
permanency of that activity. Although little guidance is provided on a universal interpretation, 
the significant activities involved in oil extraction would provide for a strong argument for a 
sufficient degree of perman ncy to allow for this requirement of the PE definition to be met 
generally. Although not an indefinite activity, the permanency of the activity is defined by the 
oil resources available, and once depleted, there is no more activity in which to be involved, and 
accordingly, the activity is as permanent as it can be. 
 but as noted, such interpretation is subject to the 
question of degree, and should be looked to in conjunction with the other requirements of a PE, 
particularly when assessing oil extraction activities.   
Intention vs. factual duration and temporary suspensions 
There is the view that a right of use for an indefinite period of time is sufficient to meet the 
duration test, but that it is not necessary.76
                                                     
72 Ibid 
 In addition, the duration test is to be applied 
73 This aligns with published reports which generally agree on a six-month minimum duration found in practice, 
which is also reported in the Commentary to the OECD MTC. 


















retrospectively, i.e. a business which is intended to last for a short period of time, but lasts in 
practice for a longer period, may still be considered to meet the duration test. Thus, in this 
respect, the intentions of the taxpayer are less important than the factual duration of the right of 
use. However, if the intention of the taxpayer was that the right of use to the place of business 
should last for a long or an indefinite period of time, but was in fact terminated after a short 
period of time, a PE could nevertheless be constituted. Thus, in these situations the intentions of 
the taxpayer are more important than the factual duration of the right of use. 
Assessing the intention and factual duration of oil extraction activities, the non-resident 
taxpayer entering into the selected ‘oil rich’ African country would clearly have an intention to 
operate in that country for a significant period of time, as such a time period is generally 
required for oil extraction activities. As for factual duration, this would generally match the 
intention of the non-resident taxpayer, as the oil extraction phase is based on exploration that 
has indicated the likelihood of oil to be extracted. Even if no oil is actually extracted and the 
operations cease earlier than intended, the shortened factual duration should not impact the 
intended duration to extract oil. 
Despite the actual period of time spent in the selected ‘oil rich’ African country, it is submitted 
that, generally, the duration test would be met with regard to oil extraction activities. 
“One-off projects” 
For activities of a special nature, in which a once-off project is undertaken, given the lack of 
universal interpretation and consensus on the required period for the duration test to be met, the 
intention of the non-resident taxpayer entering the selected ‘oil rich’ African country with the 
required equipment and machinery to extract oil would be a key factor. Accordingly, there may 
be an argument for the non-resident taxpayer having a form of permanence in the African 
country, this once off duration thus meeting the non-resident taxpayer’s intention. 
3.1.2.4 “Right of use” test 
The question that this test considers is the issue as to whether or not there is a requirement that 
the enterprise has some form of legal right to use a particular place in order for that place to be 















on”77. Second, is whether or not it a fundamental requirement under this “right of use” test that 
the taxpayer’s use of the facilities cannot be denied, withdrawn or removed without the consent 
of the taxpayer. 78
Is a legal right required or does an “implied” legal right of use suffice? 
 To do this, the following analyses are required. 
There is a general consensus that no formal legal right to use the place is required, and that 
factual use is enough.79 Essentially, under any circumstances, it is recognised that the taxpayer’s 
‘control’ (factual or legal) over the place of business, which cannot be altered unilaterally by a 
third party, is a key factor when determining whether a PE exists.80 Further, it is evident that the 
‘mere presence’ at a place of business cannot constitute a PE,81
In applying these tests to oil extraction activities, the true test is whether the activities are 
creating the nexus between the non-resident taxpayer extracting oil and the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries.  
 because there is the requirement 
that a business activity is performed at that place.  
As the equipment and machinery the non-resident taxpayer is using to achieve the objective of 
oil extraction is of significant proportions, presumably the non-resident taxpayer has entered 
into a purchase or lease agreement to use the equipment and machinery. In addition, the non-
resident taxpayer would also have to have entered into an agreement with the owner of the 
land/area in which the taxpayer plans to extract the oil. Accordingly, it is submitted that it would 
be clear that the right of use test would be met generally.  
                                                     
77 Article 5(1) of the OECD and UN MTCs 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid. See also Holmes, K. (2007). Permanent establishments. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties - 
An Introduction to Principles and Application. Netherlands: IBFD Publications BV. p151. 
80 Sasseville, J and Skaar, A. (2009). Is there a permanent establishment?; General report. IFA Cahiers. 94 (A), p23-
43.  
81 Holmes, K. (2007). Permanent establishments. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties - An Introduction 
to Principles and Application. Netherlands: IBFD Publications BV. p151. In addition, the Commentary to Article 5 of 
the OECD MTC refers to the situation in which illegal use of the place of business causes confusion from a 
conceptual point of view, as it states that a PE could exist where an enterprise illegally occupied a certain location 
where it carried on its business, however, there is the fact that the illegal use could be altered unilaterally by a third 















3.1.2.5 “Business activity” test 
Up to now the requirements have dealt with creating a “place of business” through which the 
business can be operated. The next requirement is that this “place of business” must serve the 
non-resident taxpayer’s business activity, with mere presence in a country being insufficient. It 
should be noted, that there is no requirement that a PE should be autonomous or independent of 
the head office.82
(a) the laws of the country which applies the treaty; and  
 The local business activity may be fully integrated into the activity of the head 
office, but the local business activity needs to be an activity under  
(b) under the treaty itself. 83
What is a business activity and is the business activity the taxpayer’s business? 
 
In order to qualify as a “business activity”, one needs to decide whether a business activity is 
conducted ‘in’ a country or not. In order to do this, one needs to assess the nature of the activity, 
and the location of this activity, and both are to be interpreted autonomously.  
Once established that there is a business activity, the corresponding question is whose business 
activity is being conducted. The answer to this can generally be found by establishing whose 
personnel are operating through the place of business.  
“Core business” versus “preparatory or auxiliary” activities (the negative list) 
In terms of the OECD MTC, only ‘core’ business activities may constitute a PE. Auxiliary 
activities are of a different nature as compared to preparatory activities in the sense that the 
auxiliary activities accompany the core business activity while the preparatory activities precede 
the core activity. 
The general argument that is made is that the terms ‘preparatory’ or ‘auxiliary’ activities should 
be interpreted broadly. An activity is a core business activity if it constitutes a material and 
authoritative (“essential”) part of the enterprise’s entire activity, regardless of whether it is 
                                                     

















conducted by employees, a body of the company such as the managing director, the owner of 
the enterprise, or automatic equipment.84
Key to the analysis with regard to auxiliary services is that the nature of the activity is 
understood. For example, where collecting of information is an essential and material part of the 
business in relation to third parties, this has been interpreted as a core business. However, it is 
vital that a distinction should be made between extraction of natural resources (oil, natural gas, 
etc.) for somebody else’s business purposes on the one side, and exploration activities for the 




 Exploration for the taxpayer’s own 
business purposes should be considered a preparatory or auxiliary activity with the consequence 
that no PE exists. However, exploration carried out for third parties qualifies as a core business 
activity, thus could create a PE (this would be seen as an oilfield service, refer to paragraph 
).86
Applying the “business test” to oil extraction activities, it would appear that the business 
activity is the extraction of the oil, and the vital criteria to be determined are whether the oil 
extraction from the African country is the non-resident taxpayer’s core business and the split 
between the exploration and the extraction phases (discussed in paragraph 
  
3.2.2.1).  
3.1.2.6 “Business connection” test 
The place of business which is at the taxpayer’s disposal must serve (be “connected to”) the 
business activity of the taxpayer, i.e. the business activity must be performed ‘through’ the place 
of business. The word ‘through’ has led to a discussion whether it means the same as ‘in’ and 
‘at’, and the general consensus seems that these terms are interchangeable in this respect (refer 
to 3.2.1.1). 87
As oil extraction is reliant on the substantial machinery, it would be difficult to prove that the oil 
extraction activities, provided they are the core business of the non-resident taxpayer, are not 
carried on through the place of business, located where the taxpayer has set up its machinery 
and operations in the African country. 
 



















3.1.3 Specific inclusions – the “positive list” 
Paragraph 2 to Article 5 of both the OECD and UN MTCs provide for the certain 
places/activities to be specifically identified as PEs, the so-called “positive list”.88 It should be 
noted that despite such places/activities being specifically included, it does not automatically 
indicate that, should a non-resident operate such activities or through such a place, they have 
created a PE. The other requirements of Article 5(1) still have to be met. In particular the 
taxpayer still has to have a right of use to the specifically identified places of business, and there 
has to be the performance of a business activity through it.89 This is supported by the 
Commentary to the OECD MTC, which states that when a place of business is found, a PE does 
not exist until the other conditions of the ‘basic rule’ are met. 90
This indicates a primacy to the ‘basic rule’, which is further demonstrated by the circumstances 
that the “positive list” may be overruled by the exemptions listed in the “negative list”, 
contained in Article 5(4) to the OECD and UN MTCs. 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the key inclusion is Article 5(2)(f), “a mine, an oil or gas 
well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources”.   
3.1.3.1 Natural resources 
Although self explanatory, the Commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs provide that in 
connection with Article 5(2)(f), which provides that the term “permanent establishment” 
includes ‘mines, oil or gas wells, quarries or any other place of extraction of natural resources’, 
the OECD Commentary states that “the term ‘any other place of extraction of natural 
resources’ should be interpreted broadly” to include, for example, all places of extraction of 
hydrocarbons whether on or off-shore.91
                                                     
88 Cf. Storck, Auslandische Betriebstatten im Ertrag- und Vermogensteuerrecht, 147 (1980) 
  
89 Skaar, A (1991). Permanent Establishment, Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle. India: Wolters Kluwer India Pvt 
Ltd. p113. 
90 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p98. 















Applying the international tax glossary’s definition of a natural resource,92
It is noted that Article 5(2)(f) of the OECD and UN MTCs does not mention exploration for 
natural resources, whether on or off-shore, thus, Article 5(1) will govern whether exploration 
activities are carried on through a PE (refer to paragraph 
 it is evident that oil 
is a natural resource as referred to in Article 5(2)(f).  
3.2.2.1). The OECD Commentary 
states: 93
“Since, however, it has not been possible to arrive at a common view on the basic 
questions of the attribution of taxation rights and of the qualification of the income from 
exploration activities, the Contracting States may agree upon the insertion of specific 
provisions. They may agree, for instance, that an enterprise of a Contracting State, as 
regards its activities of exploration of natural resources in a place or area in the other 
Contracting State: 
   
a) shall be deemed not to have a permanent establishment in that other State; or 
b) shall be deemed to carry on such activities through a permanent establishment in 
that other State; or 
c) shall be deemed to carry on such activities through a permanent establishment in 
that other State if such activities last longer than a specified period of time. 
The Contracting States may moreover agree to submit the income from such activities to 
any other rule.”  
It is submitted that should a non-resident operate oil extraction activities, it could well create a 
PE, however, as already noted, despite being specifically included, the other requirements of the 
‘basic rule’ still have to be met.  
                                                     
92 IBFD. (2010). Glossary. Available: http://k-online2.ibfd.org/kbase/. Last accessed 28/12/2010. A natural resource 
is defined as ‘Economically valuable resources, such as minerals including oil and gas deposits, virgin forests and 
grasslands, which occur naturally and are capable of exploitation for the national benefit.’ 















3.1.4 The “negative list” 
Although Article 5(2)(f) specifically includes the oil extraction activities, it may be overruled by 
the exemptions listed in Article 5(4) to the OECD and UN MTCs. The prime example of such 
an overruling is in the fact that storage or preparatory/auxiliary activities do not provide PE 
status, even if performed through a fixed place of business.  This further supports the view that 
exploration activities are similar to preparatory activities, thus, only the reference to extraction 
of natural resources in Article 5(2)(f).  
Despite the above, it is submitted that oil extraction activities would not fall within the 
exemptions provided by Article 5(4), accordingly, it would only be oil exploration activities 
which do not create a PE.  
3.1.5 Application to oil extraction activities 
Given an ambulatory and purposive interpretation of the OECD and UN MTCs’ definition of a 
PE, and applying it to the operations involved in oil extraction, as already discussed above, it is 
submitted that the “basic rule” of Article 5(1) should encompass oil extraction operations.  
To summarise the discussions above, this submission is based on the essential characteristics 
provided by the Commentaries to both the OECD and UN MTCs are generally met in that in 
order to operate oil extraction activities, there is clearly an existence of a “place of business”, 
i.e. the oil well and the machinery or equipment required. Once the location of the oil is 
identified, this creates a place of business that is ‘fixed’ and would be established at a distinct 
place with a certain degree of permanence. Finally, there is no doubt in that the oil will be 
extracted ‘through’ this fixed place of business.  
To reinforce this submission, the fact that there is the specific inclusion of “a mine, an oil or 
gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources” provided in Article 















3.2 Analysis of the PE definition provided in the reviewed DTAs94
3.2.1  ‘Basic rule’ – Article 5(1) of the OECD and UN MTCs 
 
Based on the analysis of the international interpretation of a PE above, it is submitted that 
should the relevant DTA entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries contain the 
‘basic rule’, as provided by the OECD and UN MTCs, the oil extraction activities of the non-
resident taxpayers performing such activities in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries would 
meet this definition, accordingly, creating a PE.  
Applying this interpretation to the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries, it is submitted that the basic rule provided in these DTAs do not differ sufficiently to 
allow for an alternative, and possible detrimental, interpretation of the ‘basic rule’. In turn, the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries should be provided with the taxing rights to the profits from 
such activities through the relevant equivalent of Article 7 to the OECD and UN MTCs (see the 
discussion provided in chapter 4) in the relevant DTA entered into. 
3.2.1.1 Fixed place of business “through which” vs. “ in which” the business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partly carried on 
Across the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the most prevalent 
difference between the definitions of the ‘basic rule’ lies in the use of the wording “through 
which” and “in which”.95
There is currently no guidance as to whether this should create any implications for the taxing 
rights of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. However, the 1963 OECD MTC and 1980 UN 
MTC made use of the wording ‘in which’. The Commentary to the 1963 OECD MTC made no 
mention of the significance of the use of ‘in which’, and nor did the Commentary to the 1977 
OECD MTC, where the definition was changed to ‘through which’. With regard to the UN 
MTC, there was no change in use of the wording ‘in which’ until the implementation of the 
2001 UN MTC. However, it should be noted that the Commentary to the 1980 UN MTC 
referred to the Commentary to the 1977 OECD MTC which used the wording ‘through which’.    
  
                                                     
















It is submitted that based on the Commentary to the 2010 OECD MTC, the use of ‘in which’ 
could have been seen to be restrictive. The Commentary to the 2010 OECD MTC provides for a 
wide interpretation of the wording ‘through which’.96 This is supported by Ludicke (2004)97 in 
his analysis of the changes in the Commentary to the PE definition, when the 2008 OECD MTC 
became effective. Ludicke (2004) notes that such a broad interpretation was new at that stage, 
and the implication was that the business did not have to be restricted to the physical fixed place 
of business, but rather that it ‘comes down to the geographical area where the entrepreneur of 
his employees perform their work’.98
The question that comes to mind at this stage is why ‘in which’ is only applied to some DTA’s 
and not others entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. The first criteria analysed 




The balance of the DTAs identified as using ‘in which’ were entered into force after the 
introduction of ‘through which’ in the 1977 OECD MTC. For the majority of these DTAs
 as using ‘in which’ were all entered into force on or before the introduction and use 
of ‘through which’ in the 1977 OECD MTC. Accordingly, the DTAs were based on the MTC 
available at the time of negotiation of these DTAs.  
100
Accordingly, for the purposes of this dissertation, with specific reference to the application of 
the ambulatory approach, it is submitted that despite some of the DTAs referring to ‘in which’ 
as the Commentaries to both the UN and OECD MTCs refer to ‘through which’ and given the 
 
they were entered into force very shortly after the introduction of the 1977 OECD MTC. There 
is no definitive reason provided for the use of ‘in which’ post the introduction of ‘through 
which’, however it is submitted that, given the lengthy negotiation process in developing and 
concluding a DTA as well as the use of ‘in which’ by the UN MTC up to 2001, these DTAs 
probably did not intend to create a different interpretation to the PE definition by using ‘in 
which’, and that the use was based on negotiations entered into prior to the introduction of 
‘through which’.  
                                                     
96 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p94. 
97 Ludicke, J. (2004). Recent commentary changes concerning the definition of Permanent Establishment. IBFD 
Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. May (1), p190-194. 
98 Ibid 
99 Egypt-Austria DTA; Egypt-Finland DTA; Egypt-India DTA; Egypt-Iraq DTA; Egypt-Japan DTA; Egypt-Norway 
DTA; Egypt-Sudan DTA; Libya-Malta DTA; Sudan-United Kingdom DTA. Refer to Annexure E. 















use of a wider interpretation, there should be no impact on the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries’ taxing rights, provided the other criteria to the PE definition are met. This aligns with 
Sasseville and Skaar’s assertion that the terms are interchangeable when assessing the ‘business 
connection’ test (refer to paragraph 3.1.2.6). 101
3.2.1.2 Other deviations noted 
 
No other deviations to the ‘basic rule’ were noted across the DTAs entered into by Nigeria and 
Sudan. However, for Algeria, Egypt and Libya, there are a few deviations in the wording used 
in defining the ‘basic rule’ of a PE for the DTAs they have entered into. 
The deviations noted below provide enough uncertainty to warrant further investigation into 
which Contracting State has actually been afforded the taxing rights in past dealings between 
the Contracting States, specific to oil extraction. This analysis would also require an analysis of 
the domestic tax legislations of the Contracting States, which is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, to ascertain what interpretation principles are applied domestically to such 
international agreements.  
Algeria 
Based on the unofficial translation of the DTA entered into between Algeria and Egypt, a PE is 
defined as ‘a fixed place where the project is wholly or partly carried on’. Accordingly, the 
deviation from ‘the business of an enterprise’ could possibly have an impact on the agreed upon 
interpretation of this PE definition, and accordingly, Algeria’s taxing rights, specifically limiting 
Algeria’s taxing rights. However, Article 3 (the general definitions) to the Algeria – Egypt DTA 
provides: 
Algeria – Egypt DTA 
“The terms ‘project (company) in a Contracting State’ and ‘project (out) of the other 
Contracting State’ mean a project (company) operated by a resident of a state contractor 
and a project (business ) operated by a resident of the other Contracting State.” 
                                                     
















It is submitted that although this definition does not define a project, it does provide that a 
project is akin to a business/company operated by the taxpayer. Looking to Article 3 of the 
OECD MTC and the Commentary, specifically the definition of enterprise, both provide that 
that no exhaustive definition of the term been attempted as it has always been interpreted 
according to the provisions of the domestic laws of the Contracting States. However, it is 
provided that the term enterprise applies to the carrying on of any business.102
It is also submitted that the term ’business’ is expressly defined in the OECD MTC to include 
the performance of professional services and of other activities of an independent character, this 
clarifies that the performance of professional services or other activities of an independent 
character must be considered to constitute an enterprise, regardless of the meaning of that term 
under domestic law.
 The UN MTC 
does not provide for the definition of an enterprise, as it relies on the fact that it is defined in 
terms of the domestic laws of the Contracting States. Despite this lack of certainty regarding the 
use of the term ‘enterprise’, it is submitted that as the Business Profits Article refers to such 
business profits, the use of project in the Algeria – Egypt DTA should not impact on Algeria’s 
taxing rights, as the term appears to be provided interchangeably with business. 
103
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is submitted that there is no apparent impact on the 
taxing rights for Algeria. It is interesting that the two Contracting States are both a part of the 
sample of the ‘oil rich’ African countries reviewed for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Although no apparent impact on Algeria or Egypt’s taxing, there is enough uncertainty to 
warrant further investigation as discussed above.  
 
Egypt 
Based on the unofficial translation of the DTA entered into between Algeria and Egypt, a PE is 
defined as ‘a fixed place where the project is wholly or partly carried on’. As submitted above, 
the use of ‘project’ should not impact on Egypt or Algeria’s taxing rights, but there is enough 
Egypt-Algeria DTA 
                                                     
102 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p23, 78 
















uncertainty to warrant further research (beyond the scope of this dissertation) into the domestic 
legislations of the Contracting States.  
The Egypt–Hungary DTA defines a PE as ‘...a fixed place of business, including among others 
commercial and industrial activities, through which…’. It is submitted that this definition does 
not limit Egypt’s taxing rights, particularly relating to oil extraction activities. It appears that the 
addition of the words, ‘including among others commercial and industrial activities’, serves to 
clarify these activities. It is submitted that such a deviation would not favour either the source or 
the residence state, as it is merely clarifying the inclusion of these activities, and it also ensures 
that the inclusion does not exclude other activities. However, the deviation does raise some 
pertinent questions which may require further analysis as discussed above.  
Egypt-Hungary DTA 
Based on the unofficial translation of the DTAs entered into between Egypt and the noted 
Contracting States, a PE is defined as ‘a fixed place, which carries out all the project activities 
or part of it’. The deviation relates to the use of ‘project activities’ instead of the business of an 
enterprise. In contrast to the Egypt-Algeria DTA, none of the DTAs entered into by Egypt with 
the noted Contracting States has a definition for ‘project activities’.  
Kuwait / Libya / Palestinian Autonomous Areas / Syria / United Arab Emirates 
In such cases, Article 3(2) of both the OECD and UN MTCs should be looked to for a remedy. 
Article 3(2) provides for any term not defined in the DTA, and notes that, unless the context 
otherwise requires, the term shall have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that 
State, i.e. Egypt, for the purposes of the taxes to which the DTA applies. Accordingly, it would 
appear that Egypt could either be at risk of limiting its taxing rights or have extended taxing 
rights, should the domestic definition provide as such. No further analysis is provide in this 
regard, as the domestic legislation of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, but there is sufficient uncertainty to warrant further analysis as 
















The Egypt–Tunisia DTA defines a PE as ‘a fixed place where the enterprise is wholly or partly 
carried on’. The deviation is such that the fixed place of business is not required to be carried 
‘through which’ or ‘in which’ (as discussed at 
Egypt-Tunisia DTA 
3.2.1.1). It would appear that Egypt could have 
limited its taxing rights in that the business of the enterprise is to be carried on at the location of 
the fixed place and not ’through’ it.  
Interpretation of such wording is once again vital, as on plain reading it may appear to have no 
real impact. However, when applying the formulated tests to interpret a PE, in terms of the 
‘location test’ (at 3.1.2.2), offshore business activities, such as oil extraction, do not always take 
place in one fixed place, at least not for an indefinite period.  Even if the non-resident taxpayer 
is moving around, it would appear that there is possibility for an interpretation that limits the 
principle created by the location test. The possible limitation is that although the taxpayer is 
moving around within a geographically coherent area, and is performing a commercially 
coherent business activity within that area, the use of the wording ‘where the fixed place is’ may 
well not provide for it constituting one ’place’ under the location test.  
In this instance it is thus submitted that applying the ‘location test’ to the Egypt–Tunisia DTA, it 
appears to be more stringent, in turn limiting Egypt’s taxing rights. However, there is sufficient 
uncertainty to warrant further analysis as discussed above.  
Libya 
As discussed above, based on the unofficial translation of the DTA entered into between Libya 
and Egypt, a PE is defined as ‘a fixed place, which carries out all the project activities or part 
of it’. In addition it was noted that the DTA does not provide for a definition of ‘project 
activities’, and looking to Article 3(2) the term shall have the meaning that it has at that time 
under the law of Libya. As already submitted, it would appear that Libya could either be at risk 
of limiting its taxing rights or have extended taxing rights, should the domestic definition 
















legislation of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
but it does ask pertinent questions for further study.  
It is noted that Libya is a member of both the AMU and CAEU’s tax treaties. The question 
which arises is whether there any possible interpretational conflict that could result with respect 
to the taxation of PE’s created by oil extraction activities.  
Based on the review of the wording of the two DTA’s, it would appear that the only 
interpretational differences could lie in the use of ‘in which’ and the reference to ‘Industrial and 
commercial profits’, per the CAEU DTA, versus ‘through which’ and the reference to ‘Business 
Profits’, per the AMU DTA. However, as noted in paragraphs 3.2.1.1 and 4.2.1, these 
differences should not having any significant impact on Libya’s taxing rights should a non-
resident taxpayer perform oil extraction activities in Libya. 
3.2.2 ‘The positive list’ – Article 5(2) of the OECD and UN MTCs 
As discussed (refer 3.1.3), both the OECD and UN MTCs provide for the certain 
places/activities to be specifically identified as PEs. For the purpose of this dissertation, the key 
inclusion is Article 5(2)(f), ‘a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction 
of natural resources’. This inclu ion strengthens the submission that oil extraction activities do 
create a PE, even in terms of the ‘basic rule’. What should be reiterated is the fact that although 
there is a presumption that if an activity falls within the ‘positive list’ the requirements of the 
‘basic rule’ also need to be met, which, as submitted above, should be for oil extraction 
activities. 
Applying this interpretation to the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries, it is submitted that the ‘positive list’ in conjunction with the ‘basic rule’, subject to 
the deviations identified above, provided in the DTAs reviewed provide for the non-resident 
taxpayer, undertaking oil extraction activities, entering into the selected ‘oil rich’ African 















3.2.2.1 Extraction, exploitation and exploration 
Across the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the main variations 
relate to the inclusion of exploitation and exploration, in addition to the extraction (see 
paragraph 1.1.2 for an overview of oil extraction activities), of natural resources in a few of the 
DTAs entered into.104
As the terms extraction, exploitation and exploration are not defined in the DTAs reviewed, nor 
the OECD nor UN MTCs and their Commentaries, the interpretation principles provided by the 
VCLT (refer to paragraph 
 The distinction of these terms provide for varying implications as to the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing rights provided by the relevant DTAs.  
2.2.1) should be followed. It is also noted that none of these terms are 
defined in the international tax glossary105
Exploration 
 either. Accordingly, Articles 31(1) and 31(2) provide 
the guidelines of the basic rule of general validity and ’context’.  
Exploration is defined by the Oxford Online Dictionary as “the action of exploring an 
unfamiliar area” or “the action of searching an area for natural resources”.106 It is clear that 
exploration is the first phase to the business of profiting from natural resources. Although 
significant activities are undertaken specifically for oil exploration, it is submitted that such 
activities generally do not reap any economic benefit without the extraction and/or exploitation 
of the oil. Although oil exploration activities may create a PE in the African countries, the 
taxing rights generally will not provide for taxing revenues. 
                                                     
104 Refer to Annexure E which indicates which DTAs have included either or both exploration and exploitation to the 
‘positive list’ to the PE definition Article to the DTA. 
It should be noted that for the purposes of this paper, it is reiterated that the focus is on the 
activities pertaining to the oil business and not the exploration business. Exploration can be 
performed by an independent third party, and as this is its business it could make profits from 
such business activities.  
105 IBFD. (2010). Glossary. Available: http://k-online2.ibfd.org/kbase/. Last accessed 28/12/2010. 
106 "exploration". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. Available: 
















Extraction is defined by the Oxford Online Dictionary as “the action of extracting something, 
especially using effort or force”.107
Exploitation 
 Applying such a definition to the context of oil, it is 
submitted that extraction is the physical removal of the oil from the land or seabed of the 
African county (see paragraph 1.1.2). Accordingly, extraction is the second phase to the 
business of profiting from natural resources, and the initiation of the profits for the taxpayer. It 
is submitted that this will be the first phase to which the African countries would require taxing 
rights.  
Exploitation is defined by the Oxford Online Dictionary as “the action of making use of and 
benefiting from resources”.108
To include or not to include 
 It is submitted that in the context of oil activities, although 
similar activities could be performed to those involved in oil extraction, as the DTAs refer to 
both “extraction and exploitation of natural resource”, this gives rise to an interpretation that is 
broader that just oil extraction activities. Such activities, known as downstream activities in the 
oil industry, could include oil refinery and even the production of oil by-products. Accordingly, 
it is submitted that exploitation activities will create a PE that extends beyond oil extraction, and 
provides for another phase of profits.  
The question that arises is whether the DTAs, the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have 
entered into, provide for less taxing rights should the DTA only refer to the “extraction of 
natural resources”. Neither of the Commentaries to the UN or OECD MTCs deal with the use 
nor the interpretation of these words. Some of the member countries109
                                                     
107 "extraction". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. Available: 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0282470. Last accessed 23 October 2010. 
 to the OECD MTC have 
reserved the right to specifically include either both, or just one, of exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources to the activities covered by Article 5.  
108 "exploitation". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. Available: 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0281490. Last accessed 23 October 2010. 
109 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p126. 















Despite the little guidance provided by the Commentaries, applying the guidelines of the basic 
rule of general validity and ’context’, it is submitted that there is the possibility that the African 
countries’ taxing rights could be unintentionally limited.  
As an example, should only the extraction activities create a PE, the non-resident taxpayer could 
operate at small margins on the extraction phase. Then move the unrefined oil to another non-
PE position (for the purposes of this example) in the same country for ‘exploitation’. Once 
’exploited’, the non-resident sells the refined oil at larger margins. In such a case the African 
country will be allocated its taxing right to the business profits on the oil extraction phase, as 
this is the PE. But, as the non-resident has shifted the profits to the exploitation phase, which is 
not a PE, the African country could be at a loss of tax revenues on the more significant profits. 
Such an example does also need to consider the transfer pricing implications of such actions by 
the non-resident taxpayer. These implications are dealt with in Article 7 to the OECD and UN 
MTCs, regarding the allocation of profits to the PE.  
Discussed in more detail below (see chapter 4.1), Article 7 operates in conjunction with Article 
5, in that once the PE is created in terms of Article 5, the attributable profits of the PE are 
subject to tax in the source State. In addition, the attributable profits are subject the transfer 
pricing principles of Article 9, which should counter the issue identified in this example.   
3.2.3 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the reference to ‘in which’ as opposed to ‘through which’ in the ‘basic rule’ 
of a few of the DTAs reviewed generally should have no impact on the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries’ taxing rights, provided the other criteria to the PE definition are met.  
The other deviations noted to the ‘basic rule’ and the deviations noted to the ‘positive list’ do 
create uncertainty for those specific DTAs in which the deviations occur.  It is submitted that 
the taxing rights of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are generally protected with regard 
to oil extraction activities, at least for those with no deviations. 















1 Why was such a deviation necessary? Is there background to the relationship between these 
Contracting States, economic, political etc., that lead to the inclusion?  
2 Why would the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries only deviate when negotiating with 
these countries? The background between the Contracting States would also be relevant to 
this question. 
3 Have these deviations been introduced to favour the source state or residence state? 
4 Most importantly, does it reflect a general practice that should be extended to the other 
DTAs the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have and will enter into?  
It was noted by van Brunschot (2005) that in negotiating double taxation treaties, the Treasuries 
of the Contracting States have to protect the interests of their resident taxpayers, on the one 
hand, and the interests of the Treasury, on the other. Given that these interests are not 
necessarily matched, the result of the negotiations is going to be less than optimal for at least 
one of the parties involved. Van Brunschot (2005) referred to his article where he demonstrated 
the effect of this ’Janus (two) face’ position by comparing the wording of the then recently 
concluded Netherlands–United Kingdom and Netherlands–Canada treaties with the OECD 
Model. He concluded that the deviations were almost always to the benefit of the Treasury and 
that no explanation was provided for the deviations.110
Accordingly, the answer to these questions, such as does the one Contracting State have more 
influential bargaining power to claim the taxing right or is there a mutual agreement, may be 
answered through a more technical analysis of the relationship between these Contracting 
States, not only in the tax field but also economic and political.  Such analysis is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
  
  
                                                     
110 Van Brunschot, F. (2005). The Judiciary and the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentaries. IBFD 















4 Allocation of taxing rights 
4.1 Article 7 of the OECD and UN MTCs 
Article 7(1) of the OECD and UN MTCs essentially stipulates that the profits of a taxpayer shall 
be taxable only in its country of residence unless the taxpayer carries on business in the other 
Contracting State, i.e. the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, through a PE situated therein. 
Thus, when the non-resident taxpayer carries on its business, i.e. oil extraction activities (refer 
to chapter 1.1.2), in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the tax authorities of these ‘oil rich’ 
African countries would have to ask themselves two questions before they can levy tax on the 
profits of the non-resident taxpayer:  
1 The first question is whether the enterprise has a PE in their countries. 
2 If the answer is in the affirmative, then the second question is what, if any, are the profits on 
which that PE should pay tax.  
Article 5 of the OECD and UN MTCs determines whether the non-resident taxpayer has a PE 
and if so then Article 7 of the OECD and UN MTCs provides that the country, in which the PE 
is located, has the primary taxing right to profits earned from the business carried on through the 
PE. However, what should be noted is that not all of the profits of the enterprise can be taxed in 
the source country, but only the profits attributable to the PE, and this requires a determination 
of the amount of the profits arising from the activities of the PE.111
It is submitted that, based on the analysis of the OECD and UN MTCs and applying the 
interpretation guidelines provided to the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil-rich’ Africa 
countries, oil extraction activities should create a PE in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
Accordingly, once the PE has been identified, Article 7 provides the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries the taxing right. However, the next difficulty lies in the attribution of which profits are 
subject to the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing rights. There are basically two 
methods that are advocated internationally for attributing profits to PEs:  
 
1 the ’indirect method’; and  
                                                     
111 Oguttu, AW. (2010). The challenges of taxing profits attributed to Permanent Establishments: A South African 















2 the ’direct method’.112
Under the ’indirect method’ the total profits of the enterprise are allocated to the PE under an 
apportionment formula.
 
113 According to the direct method, also referred to as the ’separate-
entity method’, 114 a PE is treated as a separate legal entity and the transfer pricing rules (the 
arm’s length principle115 laid out in Article 9 of the OECD and UN MTCs), which apply with 
regard to separate legal entities, are applied to the PE. Needless to say, this will pose conflicts in 
the application of the domestic tax laws of some countries, as, in most jurisdictions, a PE is not 
treated as a separate legal entity. The OECD recommends the use of the direct method.116
It should be reiterated that, even though a tax treaty may contain provisions that relate to the 
attribution of profits to PEs, it is a generally accepted principle of international tax law that a tax 
treaty cannot impose tax, nor can it create taxing rights.
 The 
commentary to the UN MTC states that there is a general acceptance of the arm’s length rule 
embodied in the OECD MTC.  
117 Rather, tax treaties provide 
boundaries within which domestic tax provisions are enforceable. Tax treaties “create an 
independent voice to avoid double taxation through restriction of Contacting States’ tax claims 
where there could be an overlapping of these claims”.118
                                                     
112 Ibid, citing Rohatgi, R.  Basic International Taxation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 530 and G. 
Kraft, “Profit and Loss Attribution Between Head Office and Permanent Establishment in Different Jurisdictions: 
The German Tax Administration’s Point of View Critically Analysed”, European Taxation 3 (2001), p. 84. 
 Although a tax treaty can provide 
guidance as to which country has the right to tax income, the tax so imposed must still be levied 
113 Ibid 
114 Oguttu, AW. (2010). The challenges of taxing profits attributed to Permanent Establishments: A South African 
Perspective. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. March (1), p166. 
115 Guidance is provided by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. OECD (2010). Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. OECD Publishing. 
116 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p26, 
Article 7(2) of the OECD MTC. For the purposes of this Article and Article [23 A] [23B], the profits that are 
attributable in each Contracting State to the permanent establishment referred to in paragraph 1 are the profits it 
might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the enterprise, if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into 
account the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the permanent 
establishment and through the other parts of the enterprise. 
117 Oguttu, AW. (2010). The challenges of taxing profits attributed to Permanent Establishments: A South African 
Perspective. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. March (1), p166, citing Russo, R. “Tax Treatment of ‘Dealings’ 
Between Different Parts of the Same Enterprise Under Article 7 of the OECD Model: Almost a Century of 
Uncertainty”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 10 (2004), p. 485 and Olivier, L and Honiball, M. 
International Tax: A South African Perspective (5th ed.) (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2009), p. 11. 
118 Oguttu, AW. (2010). The challenges of taxing profits attributed to Permanent Establishments: A South African 
Perspective. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. March (1), p166, citing Uckmar, V. “Double Taxation 
















in accordance with domestic law, i.e. a tax treaty does not generally create a tax liability where 
there is no liability in terms of domestic law. 119
Accordingly, Article 7 provides the Contracting State, in which the PE is created, the taxing 
right. However, the issue upon which consensus is to be confirmed, is the quantification of the 
amount subject to tax in the selected ‘oil rich African countries. Once consensus is reached, the 
practical question that most countries have to confront is whether the domestic law levies tax on 
the profits attributed to the PE. A detailed analysis of Article 7 in relation to the domestic laws 
of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but, the 
considerable variation as to the correct interpretation of Article 7, specifically as to which 
profits are subject to the taxing rights attributed to the source country and the taxation of PEs 
should be noted. In particular the business community has also pointed out that the lack of a 








Based on a review of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, it is 
submitted that they provide that the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have the right to tax the 
profits of the non-resident but only to the extent they are attributable to the PE created by the oil 
extraction activities.  
 
The relevant Articles in the DTAs do also provide for the two methods that are advocated 
internationally for attributing profits to PEs. It is submitted that the ’direct method’ is generally 
provided as the preferred allocation method, with the ’indirect method’ being the alternative if it 
is customary in the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to determine the profits attributable to a 
PE on the basis of an apportionment of total profits of an enterprise to its various parts, provided 
that the result is consistent with the principles contained in the Article.  
                                                     
119 Ibid 
120 Oguttu, AW. (2010). The challenges of taxing profits attributed to Permanent Establishments: A South African 
Perspective. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. March (1), p166. 















For the purposes of this dissertation, it is submitted these issues do not impact on the allocation 
of the taxing right to the African country, but more to the quantum of the profits on the oil 
extraction activities which the African country may tax, should its domestic legislation provide 
for the use of the taxing rights provided by the DTAs.  
4.2.1 Deviations 
Egypt 
The DTA refers to ' industrial or commercial activity in the other Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein', and not ‘business in the other Contracting State 
through a permanent establishment situated therein’ as provided in the OECD and UN MTCs. 
The substitution for industrial or commercial activity does not appear to tie back to the PE 
definition provided in the Egypt-CAEU DTA, which refers to the business of the enterprise. 
Further, the Egypt-CAEU DTA does not provide definitions for an industrial or commercial 
activity.  
Egypt-CAEU DTA  
However, the Commentary to the OECD MTC, in referring to the development of Article 7 to 
the OECD MTC, notes that before 2000 (the Egypt-CAEU DTA was entered into force in 13 
July 1975) income from professional services and other activities of an independent character 
was dealt with under a separate Article, i.e. Article 14. The provisions of that Article were 
similar to those applicable to business profits but Article 14 used the concept of fixed base 
rather than that of PE, since it had originally been thought that the PE concept should be 
reserved to commercial and industrial activities.122
Although, using the Commentary as interpretational guidance does not clarify the inconsistency 
between the PE Article and the Business Profits Article to the Egypt-CAEU DTA, it is 
submitted that given the nature of oil extraction activities, they would fall within the 
 The Commentary goes on to discuss the 
reasons for deleting Article 14 in 2000, namely that consensus was that in fact there were no 
intended differences between the concepts of PE, as used in Article 7, and fixed base, as used in 
Article 14, or between how profits were computed and tax was calculated.  
                                                     















commercial and industrial activities, i.e. the Business Profits Article would apply should the oil 
extraction activities meet the PE definition.  
The DTAs Egypt has entered into with Austria and Sudan, refer to ‘the enterprise carries on a 
trade or business in that other State through a permanent establishment situated therein’, which 
aligns with the OECD and UN MTCs, however the DTAs refer to ‘the industrial or commercial 
profits of the enterprise’ being subject to tax in the other State, and not ‘the business profits’ as 
provided in the OECD and UN MTCs. Industrial or commercial profits are not defined in any of 
these DTAs, but it would appear that the reason for the deviation is a result of these DTAs being 
entered into force in 1963 and 1975 respectively. Accordingly, the above discussion regarding 
the development of Article 7 is of particular relevance.  
Egypt-Austria/Sudan DTAs 
At the time these DTAs were negotiated commercial and industrial activities were viewed 
separately from professional services and other activities of an independent character, therefore, 
the taxing rights were allocated in terms of Article 7 and 14 of the then OECD and UN MTCs. 
As submitted above, there is no relevance of this deviation for the purpose of this dissertation as 
given the nature of oil extraction activities, they would fall within the commercial and industrial 
activities, as such ‘the industrial or commercial profits of the enterprise’, in turn allowing for 
the equivalent of Article 7 to the OECD and UN MTCs to apply should the oil extraction 
activities meet the PE definition.  
Aligning with the above submission, the addition of the industrial profits to business profits is 
superfluous, as the interpretation (for the purpose of this dissertation) of business profits 
includes all profits relating to the enterprise (inclusive of a PE), whether it is industrial, 
commercial or other. Thus, it is submitted that Egypt, Austria or Sudan’s taxing rights should 


















The Business Profits Article to the Libya-Malta DTA provides that 'The profits of enterprise of 
a Contracting State shall be taxable in the State where the enterprise is situated and also in the 
State where it has a permanent establishment, in which latter case, the tax so charged shall be 
limited to the profits attributable to the permanent establishment and shall not exceed 15 per 
cent of the said profits'. There is no commentary to this DTA, and such a deviation is not 
provided for in the Commentaries to either the OECD or UN MTCs.  Despite this, it is difficult 
to see any interpretational issues, where a PE exists, in the reading of the above.  
Libya-Malta DTA 
It is submitted that the DTA is allocating the taxing rights to both Libya and Malta, and the non-
resident taxpayer will be subject to tax in both Malta (its country of residence) and Libya. 
However, despite being afforded the taxing rights, Libya’s right is limited to 15% of the non-
resident taxpayer’s profits from its oil extraction activities.  
Based on the review of the DTAs Malta has entered into with the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries, it is only in the Libya-Malta DTA that such a limitation has been implemented. The 
question that arises in this regard is why? There is no apparent reason for such a deviation, and 
the answer could be that the one Contracting State had more influential bargaining power to 
claim the taxing right or there is a mutual agreement between Libya and Malta. There appears to 
be no tax related reason and the solution may only be clearer through a more technical analysis 
of the relationship between Libya and Malta, specifically in the economic and political fields. 


















As the CAEU DTA is a regional treaty, as with the Egypt-CAEU DTA, the submission is 
unchanged from that provided with regard to the Egypt-CAEU DTA. Given the nature of oil 
extraction activities, they would fall within the commercial and industrial activities, i.e. the 
Business Profits Article would apply should the oil extraction activities meet the PE definition.  
Sudan-CAEU DTA 
As discussed above, the deviation in the Sudan-Egypt DTA is superfluous, as such, it is 
submitted that neither Egypt nor Sudan’s taxing rights are affected through this deviation.  
Sudan-Egypt DTA 
4.2.2 Conclusion 
It is submitted that except for the deviation identified in the Libya-Malta DTA, where Libya is 
afforded limited taxing rights, the other deviations identified should not affect or create 
uncertainty as to the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing rights with regard to the oil 

















5 Scope provisions of the DTAs 
The main focus of this dissertation is the PE definition as provided in the respective DTAs 
entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries.123
Articles 1 and 2 of both the OECD and UN MTCs refer to the persons and the taxes covered 
respectively.  
 However, to ensure that there are no 
specific scope adjustments, mutually agreed on by the Contracting States, which could affect the 
findings of this dissertation, a review of the scope Article to the respective DTAs is necessary. 
5.1 Persons covered 
With regard to the persons covered, the DTAs generally apply to persons who are residents of 
one or both of the Contracting States, and the term ’resident’ is defined in Article 4. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, although some of the DTAs refer to nationals (which are defined in 
the relevant DTAs) and not residents, this is of no significance as it is assumed that the non-
resident taxpayer entering into the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to undertake oil 
extraction activities is a resident/national of the other Contracting State to the particular DTAs 
reviewed. 
5.2 Taxes covered 
Referring to the taxes covered, unless any taxes are specifically excluded, then generally all the 
taxes on income and capital of the two Contracting States are covered. Article 2(3) of the OECD 
and UN MTCs refers to the existing taxes to which the MTCs shall apply, and this will vary 
dependent on the specific DTA.  
Although there is very little research done on Article 2, Lang (2005) notes that although the 
treaty negotiators must mention the taxes levied in their country at the time the treaty is signed, 
Article 2(3) uses the phrase ’in particular’ and thus makes it clear that the list is not complete.124
                                                     
123 See Annexure G for the listing of the DTAs entered into force by the selected ‘oil rich African countries. 
  
In addition, the Commentary to the OECD MTC adopts the view: “The list is not exhaustive. It 
124 Lang, M. (2005). Taxes Covered” – What is a “Tax” according to Article 2 of the OECD Model?. IBFD Bulletin - 















serves to illustrate the preceding paragraphs of the Article. In principle, however, it will be a 
complete list of taxes imposed in each State at the time of signature and covered by the 
Convention”.125
Article 2(4) provides that the DTA is also to apply to all identical or substantially similar taxes 
that are imposed in a Contracting State after the date of signature of the DTA in addition to, or 
in place of, the existing taxes in that State. In addition, Article 2(4) also provides that each State 
undertakes to notify the other of any significant changes made to its taxation laws by 
communicating to it, for example, details of new or substituted taxes. Member countries are 
encouraged to communicate other significant developments as well, such as new regulations or 
judicial decisions. This also supports the view that DTAs are generally entered into with a long-
term life, thus the principle of ambulatory interpretation should be the accepted approach.  
 
5.3 Application to the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries 
Based on the review of all the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, 
there appear to be no material deviations from the wording of the OECD and UN MTCs. In 
addition, there are no specific scope adjustments that would impact on the African countries’ 
taxing rights regarding oil extraction activities, as provided by the Articles in the DTAs 
covering the PE definition and the taxation of the profits from a PE (Articles 5 and 7 of the 
OECD and UN MTCs). 
The following deviations from the standard were noted, but it is submitted that none of the 
deviations should impact the findings of this dissertation with respect to the scope of the DTAs 
entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
5.3.1 Algeria 
In the case of the Algeria-Germany DTA, there is specific mention to the ‘fees, taxes on income 
and additional taxes on income related to exploration, research, exploitation and pipeline 
Algeria-Germany DTA 
                                                     















transportation of oil’ which relates to the domestic fees, taxes on income and additional taxes 
provided by the Algerian taxing authorities. This would suggest that either in addition to or 
substitute to the normal taxation on the income from oil extraction activities, there are specific 
taxes provided for in Algeria’s domestic law. Despite this specific scope inclusion, it does not 
detract from, nor impact on, the findings of this dissertation in looking to the taxing rights 
provided by the DTAs on the income from oil extraction activities.  
In the case of the Algeria-Indonesia DTA, the taxes to which the DTA applies are, in the case of 
Indonesia the income tax imposed under the Undang-Undang Pajak Penghasilan 1984 (Law No. 
7 of 1983), except for income tax paid under production sharing contracts, contracts of work 
and other similar contracts, in the oil and gas sector, and the other mining sector. Such a specific 
exclusion should not have an impact on the findings of this dissertation, as should Algeria be 
granted primary taxing rights over the income from oil extraction activities, they would still be 
granted such rights, it is the Indonesian taxpayer and the Indonesian taxing authority who will 
be at a loss, given such an exclusion from the scope of the DTA.  
Algeria-Indonesia DTA 
However, the question is raised as to whether enterprises from separate tax jurisdictions may 
generate a joint PE, even if individually the enterprises would not create a PE. Joint ventures 
seem to be a significant exception in respect of profit-sharing agreements. Skaar (2005) notes 
that current practice requires that a foreign venturer perform its business activity in the source 
state in order to have a PE there.126 Even if a joint venturer has a joint venture partner in another 
country, and has agreed with such partner to share the net profits of the joint venture, he cannot 
be attributed the domestic venturer’s place of business unless he has performed a business 
activity there himself.127
Based on the requirement of the ‘basic rule’, should all the enterprises from the separate 
jurisdictions perform their relevant functions of the joint venture in the source state, it is 
submitted that they would have created a PE (provided all the criteria have been met). However, 
 Despite these findings by the courts of Greece and Belgium, there is no 
decisive international view.  
                                                     
126 Skaar, A (2005). OECD - Analysis Art. 5 OECD Model Convention - 2. The Basic-Rule PE. IBFD Tax Research 
Platform. Available: http://k-online2.ibfd.org/kbase/. Last accessed 23/12/2010.  
127 Ibid, citing the Belgian Supreme Court decision in Bulletin der Belastingen 1885 (1975); see for international 















whether the taxing rights allocated to the source state on the joint ventures profits or the 
individual entities profits, it would appear that based on current practice and limited 
interpretational guidance, a look-through approach would be applied to the joint venture i.e. 
through to the individual entities operating their business through a fixed place in the source 
state.  
5.3.2 Nigeria 
For all the DTAs entered into by Nigeria, there is specific mention of the petroleum profits tax 
in Nigeria. This would suggest that either in addition to or substitute to the normal taxation on 
the income from petroleum profits, there are specific taxes provided for in Nigeria’s domestic 
tax law. Despite this specific scope inclusion, it does not detract from, nor impact on, the 
findings of this dissertation in looking to the taxing rights provided by the DTAs on the income 
from oil extraction activities.  
5.3.3 Egypt, Libya and Sudan 
It is submitted that there are no deviations in the reviewed DTAs that would specifically exclude 
or include the taxation of profits from oil extraction activities by a non-resident taxpayer in 















6 Offshore oil extraction 
As discussed, oil extraction will generally be seen to create a PE in the African country, 
however as some forms and locations of oil extraction occur offshore, the question arises as to 
what offshore extraction falls within the African countries’ tax jurisdiction. It is noted that the 
difficulty does not lie in the permanent installations for the extraction of the oil,128
6.1 Mobile oil extraction vessels and the ‘basic rule’
 it relates to 
what defines the tax jurisdiction of the African country when it comes to offshore oil extraction.  
129
Before analysing the key issue as to the tax jurisdiction, Skaar (1991)
 
130 did indicate that there 
was uncertainty in the practice of coastal states with significant mineral resources and whether 
offshore activities constituted a PE. It is noted that the initial practice, driven by the ‘US 
drilling-rig clause’ and the UK,131 whereby all petroleum-related business activities, specifically 
the offshore extraction, are taxable by the ‘shelf state’. However, this initial approach was only 
really followed by a few countries, mainly due to the then recent development and economic 
benefit of offshore mineral exploration and extraction. The rapid rate of development, due to 
constant growth in the demand for oil resource, created a now well established view that 
offshore extraction activities fall within the scope of the ‘positive list’ along with the ‘basic 
rule’.132 This further supports the submission that even if one argues that the oil extraction 
through an oil rig is essentially a ‘mobile activity’133
                                                     
128 Skaar, A (1991). Permanent Establishment, Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle. India: Wolters Kluwer India Pvt 
Ltd. p419. It has not been disputed that permanent installations on the seabed within the territory of a tax treaty 
constitute a PE. 
, and thus the permanence required to meet 
the ‘basic rule’ for a PE is lacking, should the oil rig remain within the African country’s 
129 Refer to 3.1.2 
130 Skaar, A (1991). Permanent Establishment, Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle. India: Wolters Kluwer India Pvt 
Ltd. p421. 
131 DTAs entered in between the UK and Norway and the UK and Ireland. 
132 Skaar (1991) referred to a Japanese Court decision in which a drilling rig was considered a PE, as further support 
for this view. 
133 Paragraph 20 of the OECD Commentary to Article 5, provides further support for ‘mobile activities’ having 
permanence, albeit with reference to construction contracts. The Commentary notes that the contractor’s activity has 
to be relocated continuously or at least from time to time, as the project progresses (in the case for instance where 
roads or canals were being constructed, waterways dredged, or pipe-lines laid), and in such cases, the fact that the 
work force is not present for twelve months in one particular location is immaterial. The activities performed at each 
particular spot are part of a single project, and that project must be regarded as a permanent establishment if, as a 
whole, it lasts more than twelve months. OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed 















jurisdiction, there is still an established and distinct place with a certain degree of permanence 
through which the activity is performed.  
The concepts of mobility and permanence were also discussed by Larking (1998), who noted 
that although these concepts seem incompatible at first sight,134 there is support for the ’spatial 
delimitation approach’135 and what Larking terms the ’relativity of permanence’.136 Larking’s 
’relativity of permanence’ principle simply means that physical permanence has a variable 
meaning which is relative to the nature of the business.137
6.2 Offshore taxing rights 
 Both these approaches support the 
submission that ‘mobile’ oil extraction activities could create an established and distinct place 
with a certain degree of permanence through which the activity is performed. This aligns the 
fact that there would be the necessary geographical coherence in one geographical location to be 
considered as one single ’place’ (of business).  
Given the then lack of profitability of offshore extraction of minerals, Skaar (1991:423) 
indicates that the legal questions concerning such jurisdiction over the extent of the coastal 
state’s taxing rights have remained uncertain, that is until the 1958 Convention138 was 
introduced. Despite its introduction, the 1958 Convention only really took to clarifying the 
situation a few years after its introduction. The reason for this delayed effect was mainly a result 
of the fact that the UN member countries did not have domestic legislation covering the 
continental shelf, which was due to the lack of necessity of such legislation. However, given the 
developments and identified economic benefits of offshore mineral exploration and extraction, 
the necessity arose. The 1958 Convention has been superseded by, most recently, the third 
UNCLOS (“UNCLOS III”).139
                                                     
134 Larking, B. (1998). The Importance of Being Permanent. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. p267. 
 UNCLOS III was strongly supported by African coastal states as 
the 1958 Convention was considered to lack sufficient flexibility and comprehensiveness to 
135 A trend reported by Skaar (1991:134), whereby fixed temporary locations within a delimited area may constitute a 
PE. 
136 Larking, B. (1998). The Importance of Being Permanent. IBFD Bulletin - Tax Treaty Monitor. P268-269.  
137 Ibid 
138 United Nations (1958). Convention on the Continental Shelf. Geneva: United Nations. 















adapt to the evolving economic, political, security and technological concerns of the 
international community.140
This is where the understanding and agreed upon jurisdiction between the Contracting States 
needs to be assessed, in conjunction with UNCLOS III. This assessment is more important 
given the fact that neither the OECD nor the UN MTCs provide any assistance in this regard.  
  
Ultimately the negotiating powers of the Contracting States as well as their standing 
jurisdictional (sovereign) rights will prevail when it comes to assessing the extent to which the 
seabed and the superjacent waters fall within the African countries’ territories. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, an understanding of these rights is vital, as all of the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries are coastal states.  
6.2.1 The selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ offshore taxing rights  
No definition is provided regarding the jurisdictional rights of the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries over offshore activities. Although already discussed in detail, the VCLT indicates, that 
when interpreting international agreements, the provisions of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
should be followed. However, in this regard Article 32 will be of no assistance in that neither 
the OECD nor the UN MTCs provide any guidance when it comes to the jurisdictional rights of 
the Contracting States when it comes to offshore activities, specifically oil extraction.  
Applying the principles of Article 31 of the VCLT, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the words of the 
DTAs are to be followed. Following this initial step, should there be a variety of possible 
meanings, the context in which the term is used must be analysed, as must the intention of the 
respective parties to the DTA and the purpose of the provision.  
The majority of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries do contain a 
definition of the geographical area included when reference is made to the Contracting States to 
the DTA. These definitions are contained in the ‘General Definitions’ Articles to the DTAs.141
                                                     
140 Akintoba, TO (1996). African States and Contempory International Law: “A case study of the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone”. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
 
The OECD and UN MTCs do not provide for explicit definitions of the Contracting States to be 
141 OECD (2010). Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital - Condensed Version: OECD Publishing. p23. 
United Nations - Department of Economic & Social Affairs (2001). UN Model Double Taxation Convention between 















provided in DTAs. There is little guidance with regard to an all encompassing definition of a 
Contracting State (‘general definition’), specifically when used in a geographical sense.  Based 
on a review of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, the following 
general definition is submitted to encompass the scope of the specific definitions reviewed:  
‘the territory of the named Contracting State, including the territorial sea and, beyond it, 
the zones in which, in accordance with international law and the national legislation, the 
named Contracting State exercises its jurisdiction or its sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the sea-bed, the sub-soil and 
superjacent water.’ 
There are naturally deviations from this derived comprehensive general definition.  However, it 
is submitted that it captures the critical aspects of definitions provided in the DTAs analysed.  
What needs to be answered is how such a definition would assist in defining the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries’ taxing rights with regard to offshore oil extraction activities. Given the 
lack of support provided by the OECD and UN MTCs in this regard, the ‘ordinary meaning’, 
and given any possible variety of meanings, the context and intention of the definition and the 
DTA are to be assessed. 
6.2.1.1 UNCLOS III and tax treaties 
Susanti (2008) notes,142 that a state that has signed UNCLOS is granted sovereign rights not 
only over its EEZ, but also its continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its 
natural resources.143 As all of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have signed UNCLOS, 144
Article 76(1) of UNCLOS provides the legal definition of the continental shelf of a continental 
shelf state and refers to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its 
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
 
the provisions and rights provided therein should be applicable.  
                                                     
142 Susanti, N. (2008). An Analysis of the Special Treaty Provisions Relating to Continental Shelf Activities. European 
Taxation Journal. April (1), p186.  
143 United Nations. (1958). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Articles 77.1 and 77.2. Available: 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Last accessed 28/12/2010. 















territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend to this 
distance. 
Accordingly, in acquiring sovereign rights by virtue of UNCLOS, the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries could have taxation rights over the continental shelf, should the relevant DTAs 
provide for such sovereign rights.  
Susanti (2008:176) also notes that due to the complexity and the specialisation required in 
performing activities relating to oil and gas exploitation, such activities are generally carried on 
by foreign companies. 
Susanti (2008:176) acknowledges that offshore activities are usually carried on for some days or 
months and not through a fixed place of business, as such it is difficult to qualify such activities 
as a PE by reference to Article 5 of the OECD MTC and the DTAs.
When referring to ‘foreign companies’ Susanti (2008) was analysing the 
offshore provisions inserted by Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and the United Kingdom 
into their DTAs. Although a different region, this does not detract from the statement’s 
applicability to this dissertation, as the foreign companies referred to could be the non-resident 
taxpayer entering into the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. As discussed, when dealing with 
taxing rights and the power of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to tax these non-resident 
taxpayers, it is only effective if a PE exists in the territory of the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries.  
 For the countries Susanti 
(2008) analysed, each have inserted specific provisions, referred to as ’offshore provisions’, that 
provide rules in respect of such offshore activities. However, the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries’ DTAs analysed do not have such a provision. It is submitted that the UNCLOS 
should be used as an interpretation guideline, to identify the sovereign rights of the selected ‘oil 















6.2.1.2 Territorial seas 
Based on Articles 2 and 3 to UNCLOS,145
6.2.1.3 Zones beyond the territorial seas 
 all coastal states, have sovereign rights over its 
territorial seas, which extends to 12 nautical miles from its coastline. However, the ‘general 
definition’ submitted as being applicable to DTAs refers to zones beyond the territorial seas.  
Article 33146 and Parts V and VI of UNCLOS deal with the zones beyond the territorial seas, as 
referred to in the general definition. With regard to the rights required for the ‘purpose of 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the sea-bed, the sub-soil and superjacent 
water’, the relevant zones, as defined, are the EEZ147 and the continental shelf.148
EEZ 
  
With specific application to this dissertation, EEZ is defined as a zone beyond and adjacent to 
the territorial sea in which a coastal state has:  
‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the 
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. The outer limit of the exclusive 
economic zone shall not exceed 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.’149
Continental shelf 
 
Article 76 of UNCLOS defines the continental shelf of a coastal state as comprising the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
                                                     
145 Refer to Annexure H for the relevant extracts from UNCLOS 
146 Ibid 
147 United Nations. (1958). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Part V. Available: 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Last accessed 28/12/2010. 
148 United Nations. (1958). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Part VI. Available: 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. Last accessed 28/12/2010. 
149 United Nations. (1958). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Part V. Available: 















prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. It further 
defines the continental margin as comprising the submerged prolongation of the landmass of the 
coastal state, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. Wherever 
the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline, coastal states may 
extend their claim to a distance not to exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline or 100 
nautical miles from the 2500 meter isobath.  
It should be noted that the continental shelf does not include the deep ocean floor with its 
oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. Accordingly, it would appear that deep ocean oil 
extraction activities fall beyond the jurisdiction of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. For 
the purposes of this dissertation this is to be noted as a possible loss of taxing rights to the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, and an area of possible further research. 
6.2.1.4 Maritime claims 
The general definition with regard to offshore taxing rights provides that these rights are 
provided ‘where the Contracting State exercises its jurisdiction or its sovereign rights’. For the 
reviewed DTAs that are aligned with the general definition, it is vital to ascertain the zones in 
which the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries may exercise its jurisdiction or its sovereign 
rights.  
In terms of international maritime law, each coastal state in the world has a maritime claim. 
Thus, to assess whether the PE created by the offshore oil extraction activities falls within the 
jurisdiction of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, their maritime claims are as follows:150
 Algeria - Territorial sea. 
 
 Angola - Territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZ up to 200 nautical miles. 
 Egypt - Territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ up to 200 nautical miles and the continental 
shelf up to 200m depth. 
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 Libya - Territorial sea, also limited by Gulf of Sidra’s closing line at 32 degrees, 30 minutes 
north. 
 Nigeria - Territorial sea, EEZ up to 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf up to 200m 
depth. 
 Sudan - Territorial sea, contiguous zone and the continental shelf up to 200m depth. 
Thus, for the purpose of this dissertation, it would appear that without specific inclusions in 
their relevant DTAs, Algeria and Libya have very limited maritime claims, which could equate 
to limiting their taxing jurisdiction over offshore oil extraction activities. In addition, Angola 
could find itself in a situation whereby it has limited tax jurisdiction without specific inclusions 
in its DTAs.151
The implication is that the non-resident taxpayer may actually need to assess whether it falls 
within the tax jurisdiction of another neighbouring country, through its maritime rights. Thus 
the taxpayer would need to ascertain whether it has a DTA to prevent double taxation with that 
Contracting State. This has not been analysed any further and represents an opportunity for 
future research. 
  
6.2.1.5 UNCLOS III or maritime claims, which prevails  
It is not clear which prevail, the provisions of UNCLOS, which provides that the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries could have taxation rights over the continental shelf, or the standard 
maritime claims (provided above). Akintoba (1996:35)152
                                                     
151 See discussion regarding Angola at Chapter 
 in his chapter regarding sources of 
international law and the attitudes of African States, notes that all African states recognise and 
respect universal customs, codified by state practice, that are embodied in the UN Charter and 
other multilateral agreements that meet their needs and protect their interest.  This supports the 
view that, in terms of the principles of Article 32 to the VCLT in cases regarding jurisdictional 
limits of offshore activities, the prevalent international law is international maritime law, more 
specifically the provisions of UNCLOS III. This is supported by Akintoba (1996:36), in noting 
that the key to the African States ensuring that their needs are met and their interests are 
protected, that there is a tendency for African states to still scrutinise customary international 
8, it has not entered into any DTAs. 
152 Akintoba, TO (1996). African States and Contempory International Law: “A case study of the 1982 Law of the 















law that evolved before their emergence as independent states. It is this scrutiny that lead to the 
strong drive by the African states to support the implementation of UNCLOS III in 1982. It was 
the lack of flexibility and comprehensiveness of the 1958 Geneva Conventions which created 
concerns for the African states.153
Accordingly, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is submitted that UNCLOS III extends the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ jurisdiction beyond the standard maritime claims, to the 
continental shelf. 
  
6.2.1.6 Specific deviations or omissions from the ‘general definition’ 
Based on the review of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, it 
would appear that there are no specific deviations from the derived ‘general definition’ of a 
Contracting State (as regards the inclusion of offshore jurisdictional rights). Accordingly, the 
the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ are limited in terms of their sovereign rights (as the 
offshore area over which the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries exercise jurisdictional taxing 
rights).  
However, what should be noted is that there are a few DTAs, entered into by the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries, which do not provide for a definition of the Contracting States, 
specifying a geographical jurisdiction.154
6.2.2 Conclusion 
 It is not apparent what the impact of such will be on 
the jurisdictional limitation to the taxing rights relating to the PE created by the offshore oil 
extraction activities, but it does expose these countries to the risk of not being allocated the 
appropriate taxing rights in this regard.   
Oil extraction activities, as specifically included in the ‘positive list’ and meeting the provisions 
of the ‘basic rule’, create a PE for offshore oil extraction activities. However, the extent to 
which the taxing rights are limited when assessing offshore oil extraction activities may be 
excluded from the scope of the DTA as assessed in this chapter.  
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Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone”. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. p45. 















The OECD and UN MTCs do not provide any assistance in this regard, however, as offshore oil 
extraction activities fall within the realm of international maritime law, and using the principles 
of customary international law, provided by the VCLT, the jurisdictional limits should be 
assessed against the maritime claims of each of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
However, it is submitted that these claims (in some cases, very limited claims) are extended by 
















7 Oil pipelines 
The use of a pipeline to transport the extracted oil would not normally form part of the oil 
extraction activities, and the taxation of such pipelines is very complicated. One single pipeline 
might cross many jurisdictions, continental shelves, or even be laid outside any jurisdictions. 
The pipeline might even be operated automatically. These factors make pipelines unique, and 
the questions concerning the taxation of pipelines are uncertain, unsolved and unpredictable. No 
comprehensive work on this topic has been found, and as such there is no common international 
approach.155




a) a PE according to the ‘basic rule’; or  
  noted that there are various ways which a pipeline should be considered according 
to Articles 5 or 6 to the OECD's MTC, as a pipeline might be treated as:  
b) a building site, or construction, or installation project, when the pipeline is built (Article 
5(3)); or  
c) passive income, if the pipeline is leased to third parties without any significant 
maintenance, Commentaries Article 5(1); or  
d) a transport facility (Article 5(4)(a)) (use of facilities for the sole purpose of…delivery of 
goods); or  
e) a preparatory or auxiliary character (Article 5(4)(e)); or  
f) a combination of a transport facility and of preparatory or auxiliary character (Article 
5(4)(f)), or  
g) an immovable property, Article 6. 
Olsen (2006) then noted that alternatives a) and b) will constitute a PE and income from the 
pipelines will be allocated to the source State according to Article 7. Alternatives c), d), e) and 
f) will not constitute a PE and the pipeline will be taxable in the taxpayer's home state. In 
alternative g) the pipeline will be taxable in the source State according to Article 6. 
                                                     
155 This was underlined at the IFA Oslo Congress in 2002. 
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Accordingly, Olsen was challenging the Commentaries to the OECD MTC157 in concluding that 
a pipeline could be considered a PE according to the ‘basic rule’. Olsen went on to note that this 
conclusion should then be used as the common international approach. In providing such a 
conclusion, Olsen presented the principles laid down in The German Pipeline case158 in 1996, 
where The Supreme Tax Court stated that a pipeline in Germany was a PE. It would appear that 
Olsen’s arguments have been considered by the OECD in its discussion draft on ‘Tax treaty 
issues related to common telecommunication transactions’,159
‘An additional question is whether the cable or pipeline could also constitute a 
permanent establishment for the customer of the operator of the cable or pipeline, i.e. the 
enterprise whose data, power or property is transmitted or transported from one place to 
another. In such a case, the enterprise is merely obtaining transmission or transportation 
services provided by the operator of the cable or pipeline and does not have the cable or 
pipeline at its disposal. As a consequence, the cable or pipeline cannot be considered to 
be a permanent establishment of that enterprise’.
 however, it appears that the 
OECD would not agree with the pipeline creating a PE. The comments provided in this draft 
discussion document have also been included in the 2010 Commentary to the OECD MTC, and 
read: 
160
Thus, it is submitted that there is still some uncertainty as to whether a pipeline creates a PE, but 
should the non-resident taxpayer own and operate the pipeline, the income derived by the 
taxpayer from the operation of the pipeline is covered by Article 6 where such pipeline 
constitutes immovable property under Article 6 to the MTC.  
 
It is submitted that, given the lack of comprehensive work on this topic and as this dissertation 
is looking to a universal interpretation, the guidelines to such are the use of the Commentaries to 
the OECD and UN MTCs.  Therefore, the use of a pipeline will generally not create a PE in the 
source State. Although, the German Pipeline case does provide some judiciary guidance, each 
case still needs to be assessed on its own facts. However, it is reiterated that the equivalent of 
                                                     
157 Especially paragraph 26.1 to Article 5(4) 
158 German Tax Court: Decision of October 30, 1996, II R 12/92 
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Article 6 of the OECD or UN MTC to the relevant DTA would still provide taxing rights to the 















8 Analysis of the companies and countries exploiting the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ oil reserves 
Up to this point the focus of the dissertation has been whether the DTAs entered into by the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries provide sufficient taxing rights to the African countries 
from the profits derived by a non-resident undertaking oil extraction activities in the African 
country. In the majority of the DTAs reviewed it is apparent that the PE definition as defined 
does allow for the taxing rights to be appropriately allocated to the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries. However, this analysis is incomplete without ensuring that the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries have negotiated DTAs with the appropriate Contracting States in which the 
non-resident taxpayer, who is exploiting the oil reserves, resides. 
8.1 Largest oil companies 
The most recent statistics available indicate that of the largest oil companies, 86% of the world’s 
oil reserves are handled by companies originating from countries which are members of the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.161 Of the remaining 14%, 13.3% of the 
world’s oil reserves are handled primarily by companies originating from the developed nations 
of the world, all of which are non-African countries.162
Should one of the largest oil companies decide to undertake oil extraction activities in one of the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, a review of the DTAs in relation to the countries of origin 
of these oil companies would indicate whether there is any current or future exposure, should 
the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries not have a DTA with the relevant country(ies). Should 
there be no DTA negotiated to clarify the appropriate taxing rights, the analysis already 
provided in this dissertation indicates that the African countries are at risk. In addition, should 
the domestic legislation of the African countries not provide for the appropriate tax benefits 
from the extraction and exploitation of the African countries’ oil reserves, with or without a 
DTA, the African countries are left at risk of not recouping any benefit from its now depleted 
natural resource. 
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The review of the DTAs in force indicates that the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are open 
to significant risk in this regard.  Essentially out of the top 25 countries from which the largest 
oil companies originate, Egypt has negotiated DTAs with 14 of these countries, Algeria and 
Sudan 7, Libya and Nigeria 4 and Angola has not negotiated any DTAs. This risk could be 
mitigated through the domestic tax laws of the African countries.  The scope of this dissertation 
does not include analysis of the domestic legislation of these African states.  The risk to the 
African states is therefore highlighted.   
8.2 Largest importers of oil from the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries 
A more detailed analysis of which countries are currently the largest importers of oil from the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries also provides that the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries 
have not negotiated DTAs with the appropriate countries, specifically from a protection of its 
taxing rights with regard to oil extraction activities is concerned.  
8.2.1 Who are the larger oil importers? 
Algeria 
Algeria is an important oil exporter, with estimated net oil exports reaching 1.33 Mmbbl163/day 
of crude oil.164 The EIA estimates that the United States imported an average of 488 bbl/day 
from Algeria in 2009 and was the largest single importer of Algerian oil at about 27 percent of 
Algeria's total oil exports that year.165 In addition an average of 1.18 Mmbbl/day (62 percent of 
total exports) was imported by member countries of the OECD in 2009, of which about 482,000 
bbl/day were imported by the OECD European countries, of which France, Germany, Italy, the 
U.K. were the major importers.166 Another 149,000 bbl/d went to Canada, while about 61,000 
went to other OECD countries, including Japan and the Republic of Korea.167
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164 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Algeria. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algeria/Oil.html. 



















In the first half of 2009, Angola exported over 1.7 million bbl/day of crude oil, (more than 90% 
of total production) primarily to China and the United States (the United States imported 
535,000 bbl/day making Angola one of the top sources for U.S. oil imports). 168 Angola also 




In 2009, Egypt’s total oil production averaged 685,000 bbl/day, of which approximately 
440,000 bbl/day was crude oil. 170 Despite discoveries and enhanced oil recovery techniques at 
mature fields, crude oil production is declining. In addition, domestic oil consumption is slightly 
higher than production and, according to a review of Oil Market Trends,171 Egypt does register a 
small volume of net oil imports. These imports are, in part, the result of Egypt’s refining 
capacity being larger than oil production levels. Oil imports are expected to continue with some 
refined product exports in the short-term, but are still contingent on domestic demand growth.172
Libya 
  
Libya had estimated net exports of 1.5 million bbl/day in 2009.173 According to 2009 official 
trade data as reported to the Global Trade Atlas,174
                                                     
168 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Angola. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Angola/Oil.html. 
Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
 the vast majority of Libyan oil exports are 
sold to European countries namely Italy, Germany, France, and Spain. With the lifting of 
sanctions against Libya in 2004, the United States has also increased its imports of Libyan oil. 
169 Ibid, citing FACTS Global Energy study. 
170 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Egypt. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Oil.html. Last 
accessed 20/12/2010. 
171 Ibid, citing APS Review. 
172 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Egypt. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Oil.html. Last 
accessed 20/12/2010. 
173 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Libya. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Libya/Oil.html. Last 
accessed 20/12/2010. 
















In 2009, Nigeria exported most of its 2.2 million bbl/day of total oil production, of this close to 
800,000 bbl/day (40%) was exported to the United States, making Nigeria the 5th largest 
foreign oil supplier to the United States for the year. Additional importers of Nigerian crude oil 
include Europe (24%), Asia (20%), Brazil (10%), and South Africa (4%).175
Sudan 
 
In 2009, Sudan produced close to 485,000 bbl/day and consumed around 90,000 bbl/d, with the 
remaining crude was exported almost exclusively to Asian markets.176 According to 
international trade data,177 in 2009 China imported close to 250,000 bbl/d (65% of total 
Sudanese exports and 6% of Chinese imports) followed by Indonesia (60,000 bbl/d) and Japan 
(50,000 bbl/d). Additional importers of Sudanese crude include India, Malaysia, the Netherlands 
and Thailand. 178




Of the larger importers noted above, Algeria has not negotiated DTAs with the United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In addition, it does not appear that there is a 
prospective DTA currently under negotiation for entry into force in the near future.  
Angola 
Angola has not negotiated any DTAs with any other country.  
                                                     
175 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Nigeria. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/Oil.html. 
Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
176 EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Sudan. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Oil.html. Last 
accessed 20/12/2010. 
177 Ibid, citing International Trade Data 

















Accordingly, for the purpose of this dissertation and based on the economic data, Egypt does 
not appear to be at any real risk.  
Libya 
Of the larger importers noted above, Libya has only negotiated a DTA with France. In addition, 
it appears that there is only a prospective DTA with Italy currently under negotiation for entry 
into force in the near future.  
Nigeria 
Of the larger importers noted above, Nigeria has not negotiated DTAs with the United States, a 
few of the larger oil importing European nations, and Brazil. In addition, it does not appear that 
there is a prospective DTA currently under negotiation for entry into force in the near future.  
Sudan 
Of the larger importers noted above, Sudan has not negotiated DTAs with Japan, the 
Netherlands and Thailand. In addition, it does not appear that there is a prospective DTA 
currently under negotiation for entry into force in the near future. 
8.2.3 Are the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing rights at risk? 
Based on the DTAs each of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries (except for Egypt, see 
discussion above) have entered into, despite the fact that these DTAs appear to provide the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries with the appropriate taxing rights regarding oil extraction 
activities, the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries taxing rights are at risk as they are not 
protected by an appropriately negotiated DTA with the identified larger oil importers. In 
addition, should the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ domestic legislations not provide for 
the appropriate tax benefits from the extraction and exploitation of the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries’ oil reserves, without a DTA, the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are at risk of not 















9 Conclusions and recommendations 
9.1 Are the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries provided with sufficient 
taxing rights to reap the appropriate benefit from the extraction and 
exploitation, by a non-resident, of their natural resource, oil? 
This dissertation undertook the review of the following Articles of the DTAs entered into by the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries to identify whether the definition of PE, as stated in the 
respective DTAs, provides an appropriate right for these African states to tax the extraction or 
use of their natural resources by the non-resident. The three Articles reviewed were the: 
• Relevant scope Article(s) to the DTAs; 
• PE definition Article of the DTAs; and 
• Business Profits Article of the DTAs. 
The findings below are based on a review of the DTAs from an international tax perspective.  A 
review of the domestic tax laws of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries was beyond the 
scope of the dissertation. Accordingly, should the reviewed DTAs provide the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries with the appropriate taxing rights on the profits from oil extraction activities 
undertaken by a non-resident taxpayer, this dissertation does not conclude as to whether the 
non-resident taxpayer is ultimately subject to tax in terms of the domestic tax laws of the 
selected ‘oil rich’ African countries. 
9.1.1 Do the DTAs currently in place provide sufficient taxing rights? 
Based on the international interpretation base, with the VCLT seen as the key driver coupled 
with the importance of the OECD and UN MTCs and their commentaries and an ambulatory 
and contextual interpretation of the DTAs entered into by the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries, it would appear that in terms of the content of the DTAs entered into by the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries, the majority of the DTAs currently in place do provide the 
appropriate taxing rights. The deviations identified appear to be DTA specific, and it is 
submitted that they may have an impact on the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing 















9.1.1.1 PE definition Article 
Deviations were identified in the PE definition Article of the reviewed DTAs relating to both 
the ‘basic rule’ and ‘the positive list’. It is submitted that the deviations identified create 
uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the deviation and thus the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries taxing rights, and raises the following pertinent questions: 
1. Why was such a deviation necessary? Is there background to the relationship between these 
Contracting States, economic, political etc., that lead to the inclusion?  
2. Why would the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries only deviate when negotiating with 
these countries? The background between the Contracting States ould also be relevant to 
this question. 
3. Have these deviations been introduced to favour the source state or residence state? 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the identified deviations (refer to paragraphs 3.2.1and 3.2.2) 
warrant further investigation into which Contracting State has actually been afforded the taxing 
rights in past dealings between the Contracting States, specific to oil extraction activities. Such 
analysis would require a review of the domestic tax legislations of the Contracting States, 
specifically the selected ‘oil rich’ African country, which is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. In addition to the domestic tax laws, the political and economic environment would 
have to be analysed. 
9.1.1.2 Business Profits Article 
The deviations identified in the Business Profits Article do not appear to limit the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries taxing rights with regard to oil extraction activities. The most common 
deviation appears to be a result of the development of Articles 7 and 14 to the OECD MTC, and 
the reference to ‘the industrial or commercial profits of the enterprise’ being subject to tax in 
the other State, and not ‘the business profits’ as provided in the current OECD and UN MTCs. 
Applying an ambulatory approach to interpreting the DTAs, it is submitted that the use of 
industrial or commercial profits is of  no relevance for the purpose of this dissertation, as given 
















The only limiting deviation relates to the Libya-Malta DTA (refer to paragraph 4.2.1) in which 
there is a specific limitation of the portion of the profits from the oil extraction activities which 
Libya may tax. There appears to be no tax related reason, yet a more technical analysis of the 
relationship between Libya and Malta, specifically in the economic and political fields may 
provide a solution, however, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In 
addition this exception appears to be an isolated case with no bearing on the other DTAs Libya 
has entered into, but should be noted for DTAs Libya is currently negotiating or future DTAs to 
be negotiated.  
9.1.1.3 Scope Articles 
Regarding the persons covered by the reviewed DTAs, as long as the non-resident undertaking 
oil extraction activities is a resident/national of one or both of the Contracting States, the 
allocation of the taxing rights would fall within the scoped of the reviewed DTAs. 
With regard to the taxes covered, the key principle applied is that the taxes listed in the DTA are 
not exhaustive and that similar taxes would also apply. Applying this principle, it is submitted 
that should the domestic tax laws of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries provide for tax on 
the profits from the oil extraction activities and as the taxing rights appear to be appropriately 
allocated in terms of the DTAs, the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries should reap the 
appropriate benefit in exchange for the extraction and use of its natural resource. In addition, 
although deviations were identified, it is submitted that none of the deviations should impact the 
findings of this dissertation with respect to the scope of the DTAs entered into by the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries.  
9.1.1.4 Other relevant Articles or definitions provided in the DTAs 
Exploration, extraction and exploitation 
Despite the identified possible limitations to the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing 
rights with regard to oil extraction activities, some of the reviewed DTAs refer to exploration 
and exploitation activities in addition to “the extraction of natural resources’. It is submitted 















However, such additions were only noted in very few of the DTAs reviewed (refer to paragraph 
3.2.2.1).   
Offshore oil activities 
Although the OECD and UN MTCs and Commentaries do not provide assistance in this regard, 
offshore oil extraction activities fall within the realm of international maritime law. Applying 
the principles of customary international law, provided by the VCLT, the jurisdictional limits in 
this regard are thus assessed against the maritime claims of each of the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries as well as the provisions of UNCLOS III, as these provide the sovereign rights 
to the offshore exploitation of natural resources of such coastal states.  
Although there is no ‘general definition’ of a Contracting State’s sovereign rights with regard to 
offshore oil activities, it is submitted that based on the review of the DTAs, there were no 
specific deviations identified in the DTAs that would appear to extend or limit the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African countries’ sovereign rights. Accordingly, it is submitted that the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries’ taxing rights are provided by their respective maritime claims, which are 
extended by UNCLOS III to the continental shelf (refer to paragraph 6.2.1). 
Oil pipelines 
There is still uncertainty amongst international tax experts as to whether an oil pipeline creates a 
PE in the country through which it runs. Accordingly, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is 
submitted that given the lack of comprehensive work on this topic and as this dissertation is 
looking to a universal interpretation of international tax law, the guidelines to such are the use 
of the Commentaries to the OECD and UN MTCs, the use of a pipeline will generally not create 
a PE in the source State through which it runs (according to the ‘basic rule’). Although, the 
German Pipeline case does provide some judiciary guidance, each case still needs to be assessed 
on its own facts, and as the taxation of such pipelines is very complicated, a detailed analysis of 
the pipelines currently running through and to be run through the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries should be performed to assess whether the activities involved will create a PE, 















9.1.2 Do the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have sufficient DTA network coverage? 
Despite the relatively positive findings regarding the content of the DTAs reviewed, it is 
submitted that based on a review of the DTAs currently in place, there is insufficient coverage 
of the DTAs the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have entered into. The selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries are in a position where the appropriate taxing rights, with no DTA to clarify 
the allocation of the taxing rights, for the extraction of its limited natural resource, oil, are 
probably insufficient.  
Based on economic data it appears that the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries have not entered 
into DTAs with all the appropriate Contracting States. The economic data provides that there 
are 25 countries from which the largest oil companies originate, and based on the review of the 
DTAs entered into force, Egypt has negotiated DTAs with 14 of these countries, Algeria and 
Sudan 7, Libya and Nigeria 4 and Angola has not negotiated any DTAs (refer to paragraph 8.1).  
In addition, country specific economic data indicates the key exporting countries of oil from 
each of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries, and based on the DTAs reviewed, the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries taxing rights are at risk as they are not protected by an appropriately 
negotiated DTA with the identified larger oil importers (refer to paragraph 8.2).  
To possibly further exasperate the DTA network coverage risk, should the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries’ domestic legislations not provide for the appropriate tax benefits from the 
extraction and exploitation of the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ oil reserves, without a 
DTA, the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries are at risk of not recouping any benefit from its 
now depleted natural resource. 
9.2 Recommendations 
Based on the above findings, the following recommendations are proposed: 
1. All the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries should negotiate DTAs with the identified key 
Contracting States with respect to oil extraction activities. In negotiating these DTAs, in 
reality, economic or political factors between these Contracting States may influence the 















allocation of taxing rights between the Contracting States, sight should not be lost of this 
objective, and accordingly these economic or political factors should ultimately not play a 
vital role in the DTA negotiation process. 
2. Following from the above recommendation, it is recommended that the selected ‘oil rich’ 
African countries follow one of either the OECD or UN MTCs when negotiating DTAs, as 
the OECD and UN MTCs were developed and are continuously monitored to ensure the 
primary objective of a DTA is met. 
3. For the DTAs currently entered into force, it is recommended that where the identified 
deviations create uncertainty as to whether the selected ‘oil rich’ African countries’ taxing 
rights are appropriately allocated with regard to oil extraction activities, clarification in this 
regarded is accounted for in the re-negotiation process and appr priately documented by the 
Contracting States. 
4. Although the creation and development of tax treaties has spanned many years179
9.3 Areas of further research 
 and the 
development of a model tax convention requires expert resources, it is recommended that a 
sub-committee(s) to either or both the OECD or UN fiscal committees is created with 
specific focus on the protection of the taxing rights for all African countries. This is a result 
of increased international trade between Africa and the rest of the world, with particular 
focus on the protection of the taxing rights associated with the profits from the exploitation 
of the untouched natural resources (embedded with significant profits) that Africa possesses. 
The two main areas of further research to assist with the protection of the taxing rights 
associated with the profits from the exploitation of the untouched natural resources (embedded 
with significant profits) that Africa possesses, would be: 
1. Assuming a DTA has been entered into force and provides the selected ‘oil rich’ African 
countries with appropriate taxing rights, a review of the domestic tax laws of the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries, and whether the domestic tax laws provide for the selected ‘oil 
rich’ African country to benefit from the extraction of its oil reserves by a non-resident. This 
review would also look to the status of a DTA with regard to those domestic tax laws.  
                                                     
179 It can be maintained that tax treaties are a German invention. The first tax treaty was concluded in 1899 between 
Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian double monarchy. Kosters, B. (2004). The United Nations Model Tax Convention 















2. Outside the field of tax law, a review of the economic and political relationships the selected 
‘oil rich’ African countries have with the identified key Contracting States with respect to 
oil extraction activities. This review would also look to the role the DTA plays in the 

















A Annexure A: Multi-lingual DTAs reviewed 
A.1 Algeria 
Number Country 
English an official 




1 Arab Maghreb Union No Yes 
2 Austria   No Yes 
3 Belgium No Yes 
4 Bulgaria Yes N/A 
5 Canada  Yes N/A 
6 China (People's Republic)  Yes N/A 
7 Egypt   No Yes 
8 France No Yes 
9 Germany   No Yes 
10 Indonesia  No Yes 
11 Italy  No Yes 
12 Jordan   No Yes 
13 Korea (Republic)  Yes N/A 
14 Lebanon   No Yes 
15 Portugal  No Yes 
16 Romania  No Yes 
17 Russia   No Yes 
18 South Africa  Yes N/A 
19 Spain  Yes N/A 
20 Switzerland  No Yes 
21 Syria No Yes 
22 Turkey  No Yes 
23 Ukraine   No Yes 
24 United Arab Emirates   No Yes 

















English an official 




1 Albania Yes N/A 
2 Algeria No Yes 
3 Arab Economic Union Council No Yes 
4 Austria Yes N/A 
5 Bahrain No translation No translation 
6 Belarus Yes N/A 
7 Belgium Yes N/A 
8 Bulgaria No Yes 
9 Canada Y s N/A 
10 China (People's Republic) Yes N/A 
11 Cyprus Yes N/A 
12 Czech Republic Yes N/A 
13 Denmark Yes N/A 
14 Finland Yes N/A 
15 France No Yes 
16 France (Protocol) No Yes 
17 Germany Yes N/A 
18 Greece Yes N/A 
19 Hungary Yes N/A 
20 India Yes N/A 
21 Indonesia Yes N/A 
22 Iraq No Yes 
23 Italy Yes N/A 
24 Japan Yes N/A 
25 Jordan No translation No translation 
26 Korea (Republic) Yes N/A 















28 Lebanon No translation No translation 
29 Libya No Yes 
30 Malaysia Yes N/A 
31 Malta Yes N/A 
32 Morocco No translation No translation 
33 Netherlands Yes N/A 
34 Norway Yes N/A 
35 Pakistan Yes N/A 
36 Palestinian Autonomous Areas No Yes 
37 Poland Yes N/A 
38 Romania Yes N/A 
39 Russia Yes N/A 
40 Serbia and Montenegro Yes N/A 
41 Singapore Yes N/A 
42 South Africa Yes N/A 
43 Spain Yes N/A 
44 Sudan No Yes 
45 Sweden Yes N/A 
46 Switzerland Yes N/A 
47 Syria No Yes 
48 Tunisia No Yes 
49 Turkey Yes N/A 
50 Ukraine Yes N/A 
51 United Arab Emirates No Yes 
52 United Kingdom Yes N/A 
53 United States Yes N/A 
54 Yemen No translation No translation 

















English an official 




1 Arab Maghreb Union  No Yes 
2 Egypt No Yes 
3 France No Yes 
4 India Yes N/A 
5 Malta Yes N/A 
6 Malta (Protocol) Yes N/A 
7 Ukraine Yes N/A 
8 United Kingdom Yes N/A 
Source: IBFD Treaty Database (last accessed 1 June 2010)  
A.4 Nigeria 
Number Country 
English an official 




1 Belgium Yes N/A 
2 Canada Yes N/A 
3 China (People's Republic) Yes N/A 
4 Czech Republic Yes N/A 
5 France Yes N/A 
6 Netherlands Yes N/A 
7 Pakistan Yes N/A 
8 Romania Yes N/A 
9 Slovak Republic Yes N/A 
10 South Africa Yes N/A 
11 United Kingdom Yes N/A 

















English an official 




1 Arab Economic Union Council No Yes 
2 China (People's Republic) Yes N/A 
3 Egypt No Yes 
4 India Yes N/A 
5 Indonesia Yes N/A 
6 Malaysia Yes N/A 
7 Romania No Yes 
8 Turkey Yes N/A 
9 United Kingdom Y s N/A 
















B Annexure B: Extracts from the VCLT 
B.1 Factors to be taken into account when entering into and 
applying/interpreting the international agreement, to align with the 
intention of the VCLT. 180
• Considering the fundamental role of treaties in the history of international relations, 
 
• Recognising the ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and 
as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional 
and social systems, 
• Noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule 
are universally recognized, 
• Affirming that disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, should be 
settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, 
• Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to establish conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties can be maintained, 
• Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the 
sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and of universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
• Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of treaties achieved 
in the present Convention will promote the purposes of the United Nations set forth in the 
Charter, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of 
friendly relations and the achievement of cooperation among nations, 
• Affirming that the rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions 
not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention. 
                                                     















B.2 Article 31 
1 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2 The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes:  
a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.  
3 There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions;  
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4 A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.   
B.3 Article 32 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31: 
a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 181
                                                     
















B.4 Article 33  
1 When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in 
case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail. 
2 A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the 
parties so agree.  
3 The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
4 Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the 
texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.182
                                                     
















C Annexure C: OECD member countries as at 1 July 2010 
Twenty countries originally signed the Convention on the OECD on 14 December 1960. Since 
then thirteen countries have become members of the Organisation.183
Country 
 
Date Country Date 
Australia 07 June 1971 Korea (Republic) 12 December 1996 
Austria 29 September 1961 Luxembourg 07 December 1961 
Belgium 13 September 1961 Mexico 18 May 1994 
Canada 10 April 1961 Netherlands 13 November 1961 
Chile 07 May 2010 New Zealand 29 May 1973 
Czech Republic 21 December 1995 Norway 04 July 1961 
Denmark 30 May 1961 Poland 22 November 1996 
Finland 28 January 1969 Portugal 04 August 1961 
France 07 August 1961 Slovak Republic 14 December 2000 
Germany 27 September 1961 Slovenia 21 July 2010 
Greece 27 September 1961 Spain 03 August 1961 
Hungary 07 May 1996 Sweden 28 September 1961 
Iceland 05 June 1961 Switzerland 28 September 1961 
Ireland 17 August 1961 Turkey 02 August 1961 
Israel 07 September 2010 United Kingdom 02 May 1961 
Italy 29 March 1962 United States 12 April 1961 
Japan 28 April 1964   
 
















D Annexure D: Extracts from the OECD and UN MTCs 
D.1 Article 1 
Persons Covered: 
This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting 
States. 
D.2 Article 2 
Taxes Covered: 
1 This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on behalf of a 
Contracting State or of its political subdivisions or local authorities, irrespective of the 
manner in which they are levied. 
2 There shall be regarded as taxes on income and on capital all taxes imposed on total income, 
on total capital, or on elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the 
alienation of movable or immovable property, taxes on the total amounts of wages or 
salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on capital appreciation. 
3 The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are in particular: 
a) (in State A): .......................................... 
b) (in State B): .......................................... 
4 The Convention shall apply also to any identical or substantially similar taxes that are 
imposed after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the 
existing taxes. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of 
















D.3 Article 5(2) 
The term “permanent establishment” includes especially: 
a) A place of management; 
b) A branch; 
c) An office; 
d) A factory; 
e) A workshop; 
f) A mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
resources.’184
D.4 Article 5(4) 
 
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, the term “permanent establishment” 
shall be deemed not to include: 
a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or 
merchandise belonging to the enterprise; 
b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for 
the purpose of storage, display or delivery; 
c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for 
the purpose of processing by another enterprise; 
d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or 
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the 
enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character; 
f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities 
mentioned in subparagraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of 
business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character. 
                                                     















E Annexure E: Analysis of PE definition per DTA reviewed 
E.1 Algeria 
Number Country 
Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 
'in which' or 
'through which' Other deviation 
'oil field or other 









1 Arab Maghreb Union 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
2 Austria   'through which' None Yes Neither None 
3 Belgium 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
4 Bulgaria 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
5 Canada  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
6 China (People's Republic)  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
7 Egypt   Deviation 
'...a fixed place 
where the project is 
wholly or partly 
carried on.' 
Yes Neither None 
8 France 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
9 Germany   'through which' None Yes Neither None 















11 Italy  'in which' None Yes Neither None 
12 Jordan   'through which' None Yes Neither None 
13 Korea (Republic)  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
14 Lebanon   'through which' None Yes Neither None 
15 Portugal  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
16 Romania  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
17 Russia   'through which' None Yes Neither None 
18 South Africa  'through which' None Yes Exploitation None 
19 Spain  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
20 Switzerland  'in which' None Yes Exploitation None 
21 Syria 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
22 Turkey  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
23 Ukraine   'through which' None Yes Neither None 
24 United Arab Emirates   'through which' None Yes Exploration None 


















Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 
'in which' or 
'through which' Other deviation 
'oil field or other 









1 Albania 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
2 Algeria Deviation 
'...a fixed place 
where the project is 
wholly or partly 
carried on.' 
Yes Neither None 
3 Arab Economic Union Council 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
4 Austria 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
5 Bahrain No translation No translation       
6 Belarus 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
7 Belgium 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
8 Bulgaria 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
9 Canada 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
10 China (People's Republic) 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
11 Cyprus 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
12 Czech Republic 'through which' None Yes Neither None 















14 Finland 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
15 France 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
16 France (Protocol) No change No change Yes Neither None 
17 Germany 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
18 Greece 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
19 Hungary 'through which' 






Yes Neither None 
20 India 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
21 Indonesia 'through which' None Yes Exploration and Exploitation None 
22 Iraq 'in which' None Yes Neither None 















24 Japan 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
25 Jordan No translation No translation       
26 Korea (Republic) 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
27 Kuwait Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Exploration and Exploitation None 
28 Lebanon No translation No translation       
29 Libya Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Neither None 
30 Malaysia 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
31 Malta 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
32 Morocco No translation No translation       
33 Netherlands 'through which' None Yes Neither None 















35 Pakistan 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
36 Palestinian Autonomous Areas Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Neither None 
37 Poland 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
38 Romania 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
39 Russia 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
40 Serbia and Montenegro 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
41 Singapore 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
42 South Africa 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
43 Spain 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
44 Sudan 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
45 Sweden 'through which' None Yes Neither None 















47 Syria Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Neither None 
48 Tunisia Deviation 
'...a fixed place 
where the enterprise 
is wholly or partly 
carried on.' 
Yes Neither None 
49 Turkey 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
50 Ukraine 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
51 United Arab Emirates Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Neither None 
52 United Kingdom 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
53 United States 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
54 Yemen No translation No translation       


















Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 
'in which' or 
'through which' Other deviation 
'oil field or other 









1 Arab Maghreb Union  'through which' None Yes Neither None 
2 Egypt Deviation 
'...a fixed place, 
which carries out all 
the project activities 
or part of it.' 
Yes Neither None 
3 France 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
4 India 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
5 Malta 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
6 Malta (Protocol) No change No change Yes Neither None 
7 Ukraine 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
8 United Kingdom 'through which' None Yes Neither None 


















Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 
'in which' or 
'through which' Other deviation 
'oil field or other 









1 Belgium 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
2 Canada 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
3 China (People's Republic) 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
4 Czech Republic 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
5 France 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
6 Netherlands 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
7 Pakistan 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
8 Romania 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
9 Slovak Republic 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
10 South Africa 'through which' None Yes Exploitation None 
11 United Kingdom 'through which' None Yes Neither None 


















Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Paragraph 3 
'in which' or 
'through which' Other deviation 
'oil field or other 









1 Arab Economic Union Council 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
2 China (People's Republic) 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
3 Egypt 'in which' None Yes Neither None 
4 India 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
5 Indonesia 'through which' None Yes Exploration and Exploitation None 
6 Malaysia 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
7 Romania 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
8 Turkey 'through which' None Yes Neither None 
9 United Kingdom 'in which' None Yes Neither None 

















F Annexure F: Analysis of the Business Profits Article per the DTAs reviewed 
F.1 Algeria 
Number Country 
Paragraph 1 Other Paragraphs 
Deviation 
Deviation that may limit the selected 'oil 
rich' African countries' taxing rights with 
respect to PEs 
1 Arab Maghreb Union None None 
2 Austria   None None 
3 Belgium None None 
4 Bulgaria None None 
5 Canada  None None 
6 China (People's Republic)  None None 
7 Egypt   None None 
8 France None None 
9 Germany   None None 
10 Indonesia  None None 
11 Italy  None None 
12 Jordan   None None 















14 Lebanon   None None 
15 Portugal  None None 
16 Romania  None None 
17 Russia   None None 
18 South Africa  None None 
19 Spain  None None 
20 Switzerland  None None 
21 Syria None None 
22 Turkey  None None 
23 Ukraine   None None 
24 United Arab Emirates   None None 


















Paragraph 1 Other Paragraphs 
Deviation 
Deviation that may limit the selected 'oil 
rich' African countries' taxing rights with 
respect to PEs 
1 Albania None None 
2 Algeria None None 
3 Arab Economic Union Council 
'enterprise of a Contracting State carries on 
an industrial or commercial activity in 
another Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein' 
None 
4 Austria 
'industrial or commercial profits of an 
enterprise of one of the Contracting States 
shall not be subject to tax in the other 
Contracting State unless the enterprise 
carries on a trade or business in that other 
State through a permanent establishment 
situated therein' 
None 
5 Bahrain None None 
6 Belarus None None 
7 Belgium None None 
8 Bulgaria None None 















10 China (People's Republic) None None 
11 Cyprus None None 
12 Czech Republic None None 
13 Denmark None None 
14 Finland None None 
15 France None None 
16 France (Protocol) None None 
17 Germany None None 
18 Greece None None 
19 Hungary None None 
20 India None None 
21 Indonesia None None 
22 Iraq None None 
23 Italy None None 
24 Japan None None 
25 Jordan None None 
26 Korea (Republic) None None 
27 Kuwait None None 
28 Lebanon None None 















30 Malaysia None None 
31 Malta None None 
32 Morocco None None 
33 Netherlands None None 
34 Norway None None 
35 Pakistan None None 
36 Palestinian Autonomous Areas None None 
37 Poland None None 
38 Romania None None 
39 Russia None None 
40 Serbia and Montenegro None None 
41 Singapore None None 
42 South Africa None None 
43 Spain None None 
44 Sudan 
'business or industrial profits of an enterprise 
of one of the Contracting States shall not be 
subject to tax in the other Contracting State 
unless the enterprise carries on a trade or 
business in that other State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein' 
None 















46 Switzerland None None 
47 Syria None None 
48 Tunisia None None 
49 Turkey None None 
50 Ukraine None None 
51 United Arab Emirates None None 
52 United Kingdom None None 
53 United States 
'industrial or commercial profits of an 
enterprise of one of the Contracting States 
shall not be subject to tax in the other 
Contracting State unless the enterprise 
carries on a trade or business in that other 
State through a permanent establishment 
situated therein' 
None 
54 Yemen None None 


















Paragraph 1 Other Paragraphs 
Deviation 
Deviation that may limit the selected 'oil 
rich' African countries' taxing rights with 
respect to PEs 
1 Arab Maghreb Union  None None 
2 Egypt None None 
3 France None None 
4 India None None 
5 Malta 
'The profits of enterprise of a Contracting 
State shall be taxable in the State where the 
enterprise is situated and also in the State 
where it has a permanent establishment, in 
which latter case, the tax so charged shall be 
limited to the profits attributable to the 
permanent establishment and shall not 
exceed 15 per cent of the said profits' 
None 
6 Malta (Protocol) None None 
7 Ukraine None None 
8 United Kingdom None None 


















Paragraph 1 Other Paragraphs 
Deviation 
Deviation that may limit the selected 'oil 
rich' African countries' taxing rights with 
respect to PEs 
1 Belgium None None 
2 Canada None None 
3 China (People's Republic) None None 
4 Czech Republic None None 
5 France None None 
6 Netherlands None None 
7 Pakistan None None 
8 Romania None None 
9 Slovak Republic None None 
10 South Africa None None 
11 United Kingdom None None 


















Paragraph 1 Other Paragraphs 
Deviation 
Deviation that may limit the selected 'oil 
rich' African countries' taxing rights with 
respect to PEs 
1 Arab Economic Union Council 
'enterprise of a Contracting State carries on 
an industrial or commercial activity in 
another Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein' 
None 
2 China (People's Republic) None None 
3 Egypt 
'business or industrial profits of an enterprise 
of one of the Contracting States shall not be 
subject to tax in the other Contracting State 
unless the enterprise carries on a trade or 
business in that other State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein' 
None 
4 India None None 
5 Indonesia None None 
6 Malaysia None None 
7 Romania None None 
8 Turkey None None 
9 United Kingdom None None 















G Annexure G: Treaties entered into force as at 1 June 2010 
G.1 Algeria 
Number Country Date convention concluded 
Date of entry into 
force Effective date 
1 Arab Maghreb Union 23 July 1990 14 July 1993 01 January 1994 
2 Austria   17 June 2003 01 December 2006 
01 December 2006  
(withholding taxes) 
01 January 2006 
(other taxes) 
3 Belgium 15 December 1991 10 January 2003 01 January 2004 
4 Bulgaria 25 October 1998 11 April 2005 01 January 2006 
5 Canada  28 February 1999 26 December 2000 01 January 2000 
6 China (People's Republic)  06 November 2006 27 July 2007 01 January 2008 
7 Egypt   17 February 2001 17 May 2003 01 January 2004 
8 France 17 October 1999 01 December 2002 01 January 2002 
9 Germany   12 November 2007 23 December 2008 01 January 2009 
10 Indonesia  28 April 1995 08 December 2000 01 January 2001 
11 Italy  03 February 1991 30 June 1995 01 January 1996 
12 Jordan   16 September 1997 Exact date unknown, 2001 01 January 2002 















14 Lebanon   26 March 2002 19 July 2006 01 January 2007 
15 Portugal  02 December 2003 01 May 2006 01 January 2007 
16 Romania  28 June 1994 11 July 1996 01 January 1997 
17 Russia   10 March 2006 18 December 2008 01 January 2009 
18 South Africa  28 April 1998 12 June 2000 01 January 2001 
19 Spain  07 October 2002 06 July 2005 01 January 2006 
20 Switzerland  03 June 2006 09 February 2009 01 January 2010 
21 Syria 14 September 1997 22 June 2001 01 January 2002 
22 Turkey  02 August 1994 30 December 1996 01 January 1997 
23 Ukraine   14 December 2002 01 July 2004 01 January 2005 
24 United Arab Emirates   24 April 2001 25 June 2004 31 December 2004 

















Number Country Date convention concluded 
Date of entry into 
force Effective date 
1 Albania 23 February 2005 14 December 2005 01 January 2006 
2 Algeria 17 February 2001 17 May 2003 01 January 2004 
3 Arab Economic Union Council 03 December 1973 13 July 1975   
4 Austria 16 October 1962 28 October 1963 01 January 1961 
5 Bahrain 17 September 1997 13 February 1999 01 January 2000 
6 Belarus 16 June 1998 27 May 1999 01 January 2000 
7 Belgium 03 January 1991 03 March 1997 01 January 1998 
8 Bulgaria 05 June 2003 11 May 2004 01 January 2005 
9 Canada 30 May 1983 02 October 1983 01 January 1985 
10 China (People's Republic) 13 August 1997 24 March 1999 01 January 2000 
11 Cyprus 19 December 1993 14 March 1995 01 January 1996 
12 Czech Republic 19 January 1995 04 October 1995 01 January 1996 
13 Denmark 09 February 1989 12 April 1990 01 January 1991 
14 Finland 01 April 1965 03 April 1966 01 January 1966 
15 France 19 June 1980 01 October 1982 01 January 1982 
16 France (Protocol) 01 May 1999 01 June 2004 01 January 2005 
17 Germany 08 December 1987 22 September 1991 01 January 1992 















19 Hungary 05 November 1991 22 May 1994 
01 January 1995 
(withholding taxes) 
01 January 1994 
(other taxes) 
20 India 20 February 1969 30 September 1969 
30 September 1969 
(Egypt) 
 01 January 1969 
(India) 
21 Indonesia 13 May 1998 26 February 2002 01 January 2003 
22 Iraq 31 March 1968 02 December 1968 
01 January 1968 
(Egypt) 
01 January 1969 
(Iraq) 
23 Italy 07 April 1979 28 April 1982 01 January 1983 
24 Japan 03 September 1968 06 August 1969 
06 August 1969 
(Egypt) 
01 January 1969 
(Japan) 
25 Jordan 08 May 1996 23 October 1997 01 January 1998 
26 Korea (Republic) 09 December 1992 15 January 1994 01 January 1992 
27 Kuwait 16 February 2004 02 May 2006 01 January 2007 
28 Lebanon 17 March 1996 22 March 1998 01 January 1999 















30 Malaysia 14 April 1997 09 July 2002 
01 January 2003 
(Egypt) 
01 January 2004 
(Malaysia) 
31 Malta 20 February 1999 07 April 2001 01 January 2002 
32 Morocco 22 March 1989 28 May 1993 01 January 1993 
33 Netherlands 21 April 1999 20 May 2000 01 January 2001 
34 Norway 20 October 1964 29 July 1965 01 January 1965 
35 Pakistan 16 December 1995 01 September 1998 
01 January 1998 
(Egypt) 
01 July 1998 
(Pakistan) 
36 Palestinian Autonomous Areas 28 April 1998 28 December 1999 01 January 2000 
37 Poland 24 June 1996 16 July 2001 01 January 2002 
38 Romania 13 July 1979 05 January 1981 01 January 1982 
39 Russia 23 September 1997 06 December 2000 01 January 2001 
40 Serbia and Montenegro 31 July 2005 05 April 2006 01 January 2007 
41 Singapore 22 May 1996 27 January 2004 01 January 2005 
42 South Africa 26 August 1997 16 December 1998 01 February 1999 















44 Sudan 09 December 1970 13 July 1975 
01 January 1975 
(Egypt) 
13 July 1975 
(Sudan) 
45 Sweden 26 December 1994 16 March 1996 01 January 1997 
46 Switzerland 20 May 1987 14 July 1988 01 January 1989 
47 Syria 19 July 1991 01 December 1991 01 January 1992 
48 Tunisia 08 December 1989 02 January 1991 01 January 1992 
49 Turkey 25 December 1993 31 December 1996 01 January 1997 
50 Ukraine 29 March 1997 27 February 2002 01 January 2003 
51 United Arab Emirates 12 April 1994 16 July 1995 01 January 1996 
52 United Kingdom 25 April 1977 22 August 1980 
01 January 1977 
(Egypt) 
06 April 1977 
(United Kingdom) 
53 United States 24 August 1980 31 December 1981 01 January 1982 
54 Yemen 12 December 1997 02 August 2000 01 January 2001 

















Number Country Date convention concluded 
Date of entry into 
force Effective date 
1 Arab Maghreb Union  23 July 1990 14 July 1993 01 January 1994 
2 Egypt 03 December 1990 04 July 1991 01 January 1992 
3 France 22 December 2005 01 July 2008 01 January 2009 
4 India 02 March 1981 01 July 1982 
01 January 1983 
(Libya) 
01 April 1983 
(India) 
5 Malta 05 October 1972 07 December 1972 01 January 1973 
6 Malta (Protocol) 28 April 1995 01 July 1996 01 January 1994 
7 Ukraine 04 November 2008 18 November 2009 01 January 2011 
8 United Kingdom 17 November 2008 08 March 2010 01 January 2011 

















Number Country Date convention concluded 
Date of entry into 
force Effective date 
1 Belgium 20 November 1989 27 October 1994 01 January 1995 
2 Canada 04 August 1992 16 November 1999 01 January 2000 
3 China (People's Republic) 15 April 2002 21 March 2009 01 January 2010 
4 Czech Republic 31 August 1989 02 December 1990 01 January 1991 
5 France 27 February 1990 02 May 1991 01 January 1992 
6 Netherlands 11 December 1991 09 December 1992 01 January 1993 
7 Pakistan 10 October 1989 08 March 1990 
08 March 1990 
(withholding taxes) 
01 January 1991 
(other taxes) 
8 Romania 21 July 1992 01 January 1994 01 January 1995 
9 Slovak Republic 31 August 1989 02 December 1990 01 January 1991 
10 South Africa 29 April 2000 05 July 2008 01 January 2009 
11 United Kingdom 09 June 1987 27 December 1987 
01 January 1988 
(Nigeria) 
06 April 1988 
(United Kingdom) 
















Number Country Date convention concluded 
Date of entry into 
force Effective date 
1 Arab Economic Union Council 03 December 1973 13 July 1975   
2 China (People's Republic) 30 May 1997 09 February 1999 01 January 2000 
3 Egypt 09 December 1970 13 July 1975 
13 July 1975       
(Sudan)                     
01 January 1975    
(Egypt) 
4 India 22 October 2003 15 April 2004 
01 January 2005       
(Sudan)                     
01 April 2005      
(India) 
5 Indonesia 10 February 1998 Unknown, but in force Unknown 
6 Malaysia 07 October 1993 18 December 2002 
01 January 2008 
(withholding taxes)    
01 January 2003    
(other taxes) 
7 Romania 31 May 2007 14 November 2009 01 January 2010 
8 Turkey 26 August 2001 14 October 2003 01 January 2004 
9 United Kingdom 08 March 1975 07 October 1977 
01 January 19755       
(Sudan)                     
06 April 1975      
(United Kingdom) 















H Annexure H: Extracts from UNCLOS 
H.1 Article 2 - Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the 
territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil 
1 The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, 
in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea. 
2 This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and 
subsoil.  
3 The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other 
rules of international law. 
H.2 Article 3 - Breadth of the territorial sea 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 
12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention. 
H.3 Article 33 – Contiguous zone 
1 In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State 
may exercise the control necessary to: 
a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations 
within its territory or territorial sea; 
b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or 
territorial sea. 
2 The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from 



















Algeria 10 December 1982 11 June 1996
Angola 10 December 1982 05 December 1990
Egypt 10 December 1982 26 August 1983
Libya 03 December 1984
Nigeria 10 December 1982 14 August 1986
Sudan 10 December 1982 23 January 1985
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
16 November 1994, in accordance with article 308(1)
16 November 1994, No. 31363 
 
 
                                                     

















I Annexure I: Analysis of offshore rights per the DTAs 
reviewed 
I.1 Algeria 
Number Country Definition of Algeria Offshore rights per DTA 
1 Arab Maghreb Union No   
2 Austria   Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the territory of the 
Republic of Algeria including the territorial sea and 
beyond it, the areas over which in accordance with 
international law and national legislation, the Republic 
Algeria exercises jurisdiction or sovereign rights for 
exploration and exploitation of living natural resources 
and non-living seabed, their sub- soil and superjacent 
waters' 
3 Belgium Yes As per Algeria - Austria DTA 
4 Bulgaria  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, it means the territory of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Algeria, including the 
territorial sea and, beyond it, the zones in which, in 
accordance with international law and the national 
legislation, the Democratic People's Republic of 
Algeria exercises its jurisdiction or its sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources of the sea-bed, the sub-soil and 
superjacent water' 
5 Canada  Yes 
'..in a geographical sense, the term means the territory 
of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria 
including the territorial sea and any area beyond the 
territorial sea, the areas over which the People's 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, in accordance with 
international law and the laws of Algeria, exercises its 
jurisdiction or sovereign rights with respect to the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the 















6 China (People's Republic)  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the territory of the 
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, including the 
territorial sea and, beyond it, the zones in which, in 
accordance with international law and national 
legislation, the People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria exercises its jurisdiction or its sovereign rights 
for the purposes of exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources, biological and non biological, of the 
sea-bed, the subsoil and superjacent water' 
7 Egypt   Yes 
'...in a geographical sense means the territory of the 
Republic of Algeria including the territorial sea and, 
beyond it, the areas over which the Republic Algeria 
has jurisdiction and sovereign rights for exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources seabed subsoil 
and the superjacent waters, in accordance with 
international law and national legislation' 
8 France Yes 
'used in a geographical sense, means the territory of the 
People's Democratic Republic including the territorial 
sea, and beyond the latter areas on which, in 
accordance with international law, the Algerian 
People's Democratic Republic has jurisdiction or 
sovereign rights for exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources in the seabed and subsoil and the 
superjacent waters' 
9 Germany   Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the land territory, 
territorial sea and, beyond it, the various areas of 
maritime space which the Republic Algeria exercises, 
under its national legislation and international law, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
natural resources of the seabed, its sub-soil and 















10 Indonesia  Yes 
'...in its geographical sense it means the territory of 
Algeria including :    
(a) any region located on the territorial waters of 
Algeria which in conformity with international law and 
by virtue of the law of Algeria is the region within 
which Algeria may have rights on the seabed and the 
subsoil of the sea and their natural resources, and  
(b) the seas and airspace over the regions mentioned in 
paragraph (a) regarding any activity related to 
exploration or exploitation of natural resources carried 
out in this region. 
11 Italy  No   
12 Jordan   Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
13 Korea (Republic)  Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
14 Lebanon   Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
15 Portugal  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, it means the territory of the 
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, including the 
territorial sea and any area beyond the territorial sea in 
which, under the national legislation and/or in 
accordance with international law, the People's 
Democratic Republic of Algeria exercises its 
jurisdiction and sovereign rights for the purposes of 
exploration for and exploitation of living and non-
living natural resources of the sea-bed, its subsoil and 
the superjacent waters 
16 Romania  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense it means the territory of 
Algeria including its territorial waters and the seabed 
and the maritime subsoil situated adjacent to those 
territorial waters over which, in accordance with 
national and international law, Algeria may exercise its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction' 
17 Russia   Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the territory of the 
Republic of Algeria including the territorial sea and, 
beyond it, the areas on which in accordance with 
international law and national legislation, the Republic 
Algeria exercises jurisdiction or sovereign rights for 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and 
management of natural resources of the seabed, their 















18 South Africa  Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
19 Spain  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the territory of the 
Republic of Algeria including the territorial sea and, 
beyond it, on areas which, in accordance with 
international law, the Republic Algeria exercises 
jurisdiction or sovereign rights for exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources, biological and 
mineral seabed and subsoil and superjacent water' 
20 Switzerland  Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
21 Syria Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 
22 Turkey  Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, it means the territory of 
Algeria including the maritime zone, the seabed and 
the subsoil adjacent to the territorial sea of Algeria 
over which Algeria exercises sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in accordance with domestic and 
international law. 
23 Ukraine   Yes As per Algeria - Spain DTA 
24 United Arab Emirates   Yes As per Algeria - Bulgaria DTA 

















Number Country Definition of Algeria Offshore rights per DTA 
1 Albania Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, includes the territorial sea 
and any area adjacent to the coast beyond the territorial 
waters, over which Egypt exercises sovereign rights, in 
accordance with Egyptian legislation and international 
law, and which has been or may hereafter be 
designated as an area within which Egypt may exercise 
rights with respect to the sea bed and subsoil and their 
natural resources' 
2 Algeria Yes 
'...includes the territorial sea and any area beyond the 
boundary of territorial waters over which Egypt 
exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
accordance with the Egyptian law and international 
law, and which is or may be defined as an area over 
which Egypt exercises rights which affect the seabed 
or the subsoil and its natural resources' 
3 Arab Economic Union Council No   
4 Austria No   
5 Bahrain   No translation 
6 Belarus Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
7 Belgium Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, it means:    
(a) the national territory, 
(b) the territorial sea,  
(c) the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea 
over which Egypt has sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources whether living or non living of 
the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea- 
bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities 
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the 
area and other rights in accordance with international 
law,  















8 Bulgaria Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, includes the territorial sea 
and any area adjacent to the coast beyond the territorial 
waters, over which Egypt exercises sovereign rights, in 
accordance with Egyptian legislation and international 
law, and which has been or may hereafter be 
designated as an area within which Egypt may exercise 
rights with respect to the sea bed and subsoil and their 
natural resources' 
9 Canada Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
10 China (People's Republic) Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, the term "Egypt" includes:    
(a) the Egyptian territory;  
(b) the territorial seas thereof; and  
(c) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the territorial 
sea, over which Egypt exercises sovereign rights, in 
accordance with international law for the purpose of 
exploration or the exploitation of the natural resources 
of such area, but only to the extent that the person, 
property or activity to which the Convention is being 
applied is connected with such exploration or 
exploitation' 
11 Cyprus Yes As per Egypt - China DTA 
12 Czech Republic Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
13 Denmark Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
14 Finland No   
15 France Yes 
'...the Arab Republic of Egypt and areas situated 
outside the territorial waters adjacent to those 
territorial waters, over which, in accordance with 
international law, Egypt may exercise sovereign rights 
with respect to the seabed and subsoil' 
16 France (Protocol) No   
17 Germany Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, the area in which the tax 
law of the Contracting State concerned is in force, as 
well as the continental shelf adjacent to the territorial 
sea, insofar as the Contracting State concerned 
exercises there in conformity with international law 
sovereign rights to explore the continental shelf and 















18 Greece Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, includes the territorial sea 
and any area adjacent to the coast beyond the territorial 
waters, over which Egypt exercises sovereign rights, in 
accordance with Egyptian legislation and international 
law and which has been or may hereafter be designated 
as an area within which Egypt may exercise rights with 
respect to the sea bed and subsoil and their natural 
resources' 
19 Hungary Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
20 India No   
21 Indonesia Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
22 Iraq No   
23 Italy No   
24 Japan Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means respectively all the 
territory in which the laws relating to tax of Japan or 
the United Arab Republic of Egypt are enforced' 
25 Jordan   No translation 
26 Korea (Republic) Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, the term means all the 
territory in which the laws relating to Egyptian tax are 
in force. The term also includes the territorial sea 
thereof and the seabed and subsoil at the submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the 
territorial sea, over which Egypt exercises sovereign 
rights, in accordance with international law, for the 
purpose of exploration and exploitation of the natural 
resources of such area' 
27 Kuwait Yes 
'...in a geographical sense includes the territorial waters 
of any contiguous zone beyond the territorial waters of 
which it exercises Egypt sovereign rights under 
Egyptian legislation and in accordance with 
international law, which established or may be 
determined as a practice by Egypt rights with respect 
to the seabed or the subsoil or natural resources' 















29 Libya Yes 
'...in a geographical sense intended.  
1 the national territory.  
2 the territorial sea.  
3 the area beyond the territorial sea adjacent to that 
exercised by Egypt sovereign rights under international 
law with a view to exploring and exploiting, 
conserving natural resources and management, whether 
living or non-living that exist in the water above the 
seabed or at the bottom of the bottom and inwardly, as 
well as other activities related to economic exploitation 
and exploration in the region and all other rights.  
4  the Continental Shelf' 
30 Malaysia Yes As per Egypt - Belgium DTA 
31 Malta Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, means the territory and the 
territorial waters of the Arab Republic of Egypt and its 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf as 
defined in accordance with international law.' 
32 Morocco   No translation 
33 Netherlands Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
34 Norway No   
35 Pakistan No   
36 Palestinian Autonomous Areas Yes 
'...in a geographical sense intended:  
1 National territory.  
2 Territorial sea.  
3 The area beyond the territorial sea adjacent to it and 
practiced by Egypt sovereign rights under international 
law with a view to exploring and exploiting, 
conserving natural resources and management, whether 
living or inanimate, which are found in the waters 
above the seabed or the bottom of the bottom and 
inwardly, as well as other activities related to 
exploitation economic organization, explore, and all 
other rights.  
4 Continental shelf' 
37 Poland Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 















39 Russia Yes 
'...including the land territory, the territorial sea, as 
well as [its] exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf determined in accordance with the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea' 
40 Serbia and Montenegro No   
41 Singapore No   
42 South Africa Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
43 Spain Yes 
'...in a geographical sense include each Party's 
territory and territorial waters as well as any area 
outside the territorial sea where, in accordance with 
the domestic law of each Party and international 
law, either Party exercises or may in the future 
exercise jurisdiction or sovereign rights with respect 
to the seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters and 
their natural resources' 
44 Sudan No   
45 Sweden Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, the term "Egypt" 
includes:    
(a) the national territory;  
(b) the territorial seas thereof; and  
(c) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjacent to the coast thereof, but beyond the 
territorial sea, over which Egypt exercises sovereign 
rights, in accordance with international law for the 
purpose of exploration or the exploitation of the 
natural resources of such area, but only to the extent 
that the person, property or activity to which the 
Convention is being applied is connected with such 
exploration or exploitation' 















47 Syria Yes 
'...in a geographical sense and is intended to:  
1 the national territory 
2 And the territorial sea 
3 the area beyond the territorial sea adjacent to it 
which it exercises Egypt sovereign rights under 
international law with a view to exploring and 
exploiting, conserving natural resources and 
management, whether living or non-living that exist 
in the water above the seabed or at the bottom of the 
bottom and inwardly; as well as other activities 
related to economic exploitation and exploration of 
the area and all other rights 
4 of the Continental Shelf' 
48 Tunisia No   
49 Turkey Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
50 Ukraine Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
51 United Arab Emirates Yes 
'...in a geographical sense, the expression Egypt 
include:  
1 The national territory 
2 Regional sea 
3 Area beyond the territorial sea and adjacent 
exercised by Egypt sovereign rights under 
international law with a view to exploring and 
exploiting, conserving natural resources and 
management of both whether living or non-living 
that exist in the water above the seabed or at the 
bottom of the bottom and a hidden and 0 as well as 
other activities on the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the area and all other rights.  
4 Continental Shelf' 
52 United Kingdom Yes As per Egypt - Albania DTA 
53 United States No   
54 Yemen   No translation 

















Number Country Definition of Algeria Offshore rights per DTA 
1 Arab Maghreb Union  No   
2 Egypt Yes 
'...in a geographical sense intended.  
1 the national territory.  
2 the territorial sea.  
3 the area beyond the territorial sea adjacent to that 
exercised by Egypt sovereign rights under international 
law with a view to exploring and exploiting, 
conserving natural resources and management, whether 
living or non-living that exist in the water above the 
seabed or at the bottom of the bottom and inwardly, as 
well as other activities related to economic exploitation 
and exploration in the region and all other rights.  
4  the Continental Shelf' 
3 France Yes 
'...the territory of the Great Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, including airspace, territorial sea, and 
beyond it the zone in which, in accordance with 
international law, the Great Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya has sovereign rights for exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources of the seabed and 
subsoil and the superjacent waters' 
4 India No   
5 Malta No   
6 Malta (Protocol) No change   
7 Ukraine Yes 
'...the territory of the Great Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya including the air space, the territorial 
waters , and any other area outside the territorial waters 
in which Libya has according to the international law, 
rights of sovereignty for purposes of exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and 
its subsoil as well as its waters above it' 
8 United Kingdom Yes As per Libya - Ukraine DTA 
















Number Country Definition of Algeria Offshore rights per DTA 
1 Belgium Yes 
'...including any area outside the territorial waters of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria which in accordance 
with international law has been or may hereafter be 
designated, under the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria concerning the continental shelf, as an area 
within which the rights of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their 
natural resources may be exercised' 
2 Canada Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
3 China (People's Republic) Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
4 Czech Republic Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
5 France Yes 
'...including any area outside the territorial sea of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria which in accordance with 
international law has been or may hereafter be 
designated, under the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and in accordance with international law 
concerning the continental shelf, as an area within 
which the rights of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
with respect to the sea-bed, sub-soil, their natural 
resources, and superjacent waters may be exercised' 
6 Netherlands Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
7 Pakistan Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
8 Romania Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
9 Slovak Republic Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
10 South Africa Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 
11 United Kingdom Yes As per Nigeria - Belgium DTA 

















Number Country Definition of Algeria Offshore rights per DTA 
1 Arab Economic Union Council No   
2 China (People's Republic) Yes 
'...including any area outside the territorial sea of the 
Republic of the Sudan which in accordance with 
international law has been or may be hereafter be 
designated, under the laws of the Republic of the 
Sudan concerning the continental shelf, as an area 
within which the rights of the Republic of the Sudan 
with respect to sea-bed and sub-soil and their natural 
resources may be exercised' 
3 Egypt No   
4 India Yes 
'...in the geographical sense, it includes any area 
outside the territorial sea of the Republic of the Sudan, 
which in accordance with international law, has been 
or may hereafter be designated under the laws of the 
Republic of the Sudan, concerning the continental 
shelf, as an area within which the sovereign right of the 
Republic of the Sudan with respect to the seabed and 
sub-soil and their natural resources may be exercised' 
5 Indonesia No   
6 Malaysia Yes As per the Sudan - China DTA 
7 Romania Yes 
'...the territory of Sudan, including any area over which 
the Republic of Sudan shall exercise, in accordance 
with international law, sovereign rights or jurisdiction' 
8 Turkey Yes 
'...the Sudan territory, territorial sea, as well as the 
maritime areas over which it has jurisdiction or 
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration, 
exploration and conservation of natural resources, 















9 United Kingdom Yes 
'...including any area outside the territorial sea of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan which in 
accordance with international law has been or may 
hereafter be designated, under the laws of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan concerning the 
Continental Shelf, as an area within which the rights of 
the Democratic Republic of the Sudan with respect to 
the sea bed and sub-soil and their natural resources 
may be exercised' 















J Annexure J: DTAs entered into by the selected 'oil rich' 
African countries with the largest countries importing oil 
J.1 Algeria 
 
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Algeria. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Algeria/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
J.2 Angola 
Rank Oil import country 
DTA entered into 
with country by 
Angola 
1 United States  
2 France  
3 Germany  
4 Italy  
5 United Kingdom  
6 Canada  
7 Japan  
8 Korea (Republic)  
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Angola. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Angola/Oil.html. Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
Rank Oil import country 
DTA entered into 
with country by 
Algeria 
1 United States  
2 France  
3 Germany  
4 Italy  
5 United Kingdom  
6 Canada  
7 Japan  
















Rank Oil import country 
DTA entered into 
with country by 
Egypt 
1 None identified 
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Egypt. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Oil.html. 
Last accessed 20/12/2010. 
J.4 Libya 
Rank Oil import country DTA entered into with country by Libya 
1 Italy  
2 Germany  
3 France  
4 Spain  
5 United States  
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Libya. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Libya/Oil.html. 
Last accessed 20/12/2010.  
J.5 Nigeria 
Rank Oil import country 
DTA entered into 
with country by 
Nigeria 
1 United States  
2 France  
3 Germany  
4 Netherlands  
5 United Kingdom  
6 Japan  
7 China  
8 Brazil  
9 South Africa  
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Nigeria. Available: 
















Rank Oil import country 
DTA entered into 
with country by 
Sudan 
1 China  
2 Indonesia  
3 Japan  
4 India  
5 Malaysia  
6 Netherlands  
7 Thailand  
Source: EIA. (2010). Country Analysis Briefs - Sudan. Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Oil.html. 















K Annexure K: Objectives of the CAEU 
The objectives of the CAEU are: 
• To formulate regulations, legislations, and tariffs, aiming at the creation of a unified Arab 
custom area. 
• To co-ordinate foreign trade policies with a view to ensuring the co-ordination of the 
region's economy vis-à-vis world economy. 
• To co-ordinate economic development and formulate programs for the attainment of joint 
Arab development project. 
• To co-ordinate policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade. 
• To co-ordinate financial and monetary policies with the aim of achieving monetary unity. 
• To co-ordinate legislations for taxes and duties. 
• To formulate unified regulations for transport and transit in the contracting countries. 
• To draft common legislations on labour and social security. 
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